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Professor Kennedy has written a great and wise book. Surveying
"the bitterly contested crossroads" where race and the criminal justice
system intersect (p. ix), Kennedy places himself roughly equidistant
from Justice Thurgood Marshall, for whom he clerked, and Marshall's
successor, Justice Clarence Thomas. Rhetorically and politically, Ken-
nedy's middle position renders him vulnerable to potshots from both
left and right. But Kennedy defends his ground superbly with a won-
derfully rich and eminently readable blend of historical narrative, doc-
trinal analysis, empirical survey, and commonsense argument.
At every turn, Kennedy strives to steer between overstatement and
understatement. Today's political right often suffers from amnesia
about America's racist past and from complacency about its racial
present, while today's academic left often refuses to acknowledge the
real progress that we have made over the last two generations and the
resulting complexity of our current situation. In response to both,
Kennedy presents a third view - grim but not hopeless, passionate
but not paranoid. Precisely because racism has been so real in our his-
tory and still exists today, we must take care not to trivialize the "r-
word" by calling everything we don't like "racist." Precisely because
blacks have suffered - and are continuing to suffer - as criminal
suspects, defendants, and convicts on the one hand, and as victims of
crime on the other, racial justice issues are complicated. Precisely be-
cause blacks disagree among themselves (as do whites and other racial
groups) about the criminal justice system, many issues are not, well,
black-and-white.' In such a world, factual punctiliousness and fair-
minded treatment of counterarguments are not merely scholarly vir-
tues suitable for a Harvard professor publishing his first book, but
democratic virtues appropriate for a public intellectual writing to help
fellow citizens make sense of some of the most difficult and divisive
issues of our day.
It is impossible to do justice to such a grand and rich book in such
a small space, but in what follows I first sketch a few of Kennedy's
most important points and then turn to a couple of places in the book
at which he does not persuade me. With a book that aims for fairness
and balance, it might seem somewhat unfair and imbalanced to high-
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1 For another reason why the current landscape is not black-and-white, see Viet D. Dinh,
Races, Crime, and the Law, iii HARv. L. REV. 1289 (x998), also reviewing Kennedy's book.
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light two of the spots where I disagree with Kennedy rather than the
many places where I find myself persuaded. In defense, I try to show
that even when I disagree with Kennedy, I agree with him. That is, on
the two topics at issue - the constitutionality of peremptory chal-
lenges and the proper remedial response to racially skewed grand ju-
ries - I hope to show that Kennedy errs by ignoring the implications
of other arguments that he advances elsewhere in his book. And in the
spirit of ideological balance, I have chosen one topic (peremptories) on
which my position tracks Justice Marshall's views and a second topic
(remedies) on which my position might place me closer to the views of
Justice Thomas.
I. THREE CHEERS
The American legal system has historically targeted blacks for spe-
cial disadvantage as "suspects, defendants, and convicts" (p. 76). Ken-
nedy traces the roots of this inequality to black slavery and proceeds to
follow the story line up to the present. Even today, judges allow race
to be used as a proxy for criminal suspiciousness in various cases. The
Supreme Court, for example, has suggested that Border Patrol agents
may subject motorists of "apparent Mexican ancestry" to more exten-
sive delay and more intrusive questioning, on the ground that race in
this context "clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need to be
served."2 But if our Constitution is supposed to be color-blind, Ken-
nedy asks, why is this kind of "racial tax" permissible (p. 16i)? If race
cannot or should not be used as a factor to advantage persons of color
in affirmative action scenarios, as many Justices and judges seem to
believe,3 why can it be used as a factor to disadvantage persons of
color in the border patrol scenario (p. 16o)? In posing such provoca-
tive questions, Kennedy aims "to facilitate the emergence of a polity
that is overwhelmingly indifferent to racial differences, a polity that
looks beyond looks" (p. 167). 4
Kennedy makes similarly provocative points when he turns from
suspects to defendants and convicts. Under slavery, blacks as a class
2 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564 n.17 (1976). Professor Kennedy dis-
cusses this case and the Court's language (pp. 142-43).
3 Professor Kennedy seems to distance himself from such views. For instance, he says: "I do
not believe, as does Justice Thomas, that all racial lines are equally dangerous" (p. 245). For Ken-
nedy's earlier-expressed views on this subject, see Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1328-37 (1986), which offers
a qualified defense of affirmative action.
4 Elsewhere in the book, Kennedy sounds similar themes. For instance, he states: "Further-
more, there is the deeper question of whether the 'looking like America' metaphor is an appropri-
ate guiding aspiration. I do not think that it is" (p. 252). In addition, in the last chapter's last
sentence, he affirms "the uncompromisable ideal of treating all persons equally regardless of race,




were stripped of their liberty and, even if free, were denied the right to
vote (and the right to serve on juries) in most states. In response to
Emancipation and Reconstruction, racist laws mutated in form. Un-
der the infamous Southern Black Codes of the i86os, various forms of
behavior were legal for whites but criminal for blacks, and even when
the criminal code laid down color-blind rules of conduct, black skin
formally triggered harsher (and often savage) punishment. When these
laws were invalidated by courts and by Congress, they were ultimately
replaced in many jurisdictions by laws that were facially color-blind
but racist in both purpose and effect: white-dominated legislatures in-
tentionally targeted behavior thought to be more common among
black folk and punished such behavior with prison slavery and disen-
franchisement. White-dominated police forces, judges, juries, and
prison officials helped administer this scheme with a racially uneven
hand and unequal eye. Ironically, even the Reconstruction Amend-
ments could be invoked in support of the new Southern solution. The
text of the Thirteenth Amendment, after all, seemed explicitly to coun-
tenance prison slavery in its prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude "except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted,"5 and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seemed explicitly to embrace disenfranchisement as an appropri-
ate criminal punishment.6 Once disenfranchised, black convicts were
forever barred from voting for legislators and serving on juries, pun-
ishments that fed a vicious cycle of white domination of these institu-
tions of criminal justice.
Brutal bodily punishment of black offenders - a regime born in
slavery - algo survived Emancipation and Reconstruction, albeit in
mutated form. Under slavery, "[1hong after maiming, branding, ear
cropping, whipping, castration, and other sorts of physically injurious
punishments had waned as an approved method of chastising whites,
they remained available for the correction of slaves" (p. 77). Whipping
was the punishment of choice, and Kennedy identifies both its ideo-
logical and its economic underpinnings. Ideologically, whites viewed
blacks as "primitive, wild, inferior beings ... fundamentally different
from whites, and thus in need of more coercive social control" (p. 77).
Economically, masters needed to spur slaves to work hard and obey
the (masters') rules, but masters also needed to preserve slaves' pro-
ductive capacities (p. 78). Punishment had to hurt and deter, but a
slave's ordinary lot was so poor that the penal options were limited.
Criminal fines don't work if a person has no money, and deprivation
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIM, § r. Compare Kennedy's comment: "After the abolition of slav-
ery, incarceration became a 'legal' way to subject blacks to servitude" (p. i3o).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("[W]hen the right to vote at any election ... is denied ...
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of represen-
tation ... shall be reduced...
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of liberty via imprisonment is not much of a deprivation if a person
has little bodily liberty to begin with. Capital punishment might deter,
but it would also have killed the proverbial golden-egg-laying goose -
and unlike geese, slaves understood all this, which reduced the credi-
bility of the death threat for a broad range of minor misconduct and
shirking. Ironically, for some black offenders, the regime that took
shape in the South after the Civil War was even worse. A system of
prison chain gangs and leased labor "often bore a striking similarity to
the most lurid abolitionist stereotypes of slavery" (p. 92),1 and "[i]n
1877-I88O, of 285 convicts sent to build a railroad in South Carolina,
128, or 44.9 percent, died" (p. 92). Kennedy grimly quotes the South
Carolina warden responsible for these convict laborers: "casualties
would have been less if the convicts were property having a value to
preserve" (p. 92)."
Where does all this history leave us today? On one view, things
have not fundamentally changed. On two occasions, Kennedy presents
the following sobering statistic: "In 199o, for every ioo,ooo whites,
about 289 were in jail or in prison. For every ioo,ooo blacks, about
i,86o were in jail or prison" (pp. 23, 134). The decision to use the
criminal justice system to pursue a highly punitive war on drugs - a
decision that Kennedy suggests may well be a "mistaken" approach in
comparison with noncriminal models of drug regulation (p. 386) - has
had a particularly devastating effect on black incarceration rates in re-
cent years (p. 351). And so have specific choices made within the
broader war. Under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 9 a per-
son possessing a mere fifty grams (less than two ounces) of crack co-
caine with an intent to distribute must be sentenced to at least ten
years in prison.' 0 In contrast, a person possessing powder cocaine
with intent to distribute must have at least 50oo grams - ioo times
more, by weight - before being hit with the same draconian manda-
tory minimum sentence." Culturally, it appears that crack is the drug
of choice for many blacks, while powder is preferred by many whites:
"In 1992, 92.6 percent of the defendants convicted for crack cocaine
offenses nationally were black and only 4.7 percent white. In com-
parison, 45.2 percent of defendants sentenced for powder cocaine of-
fenses were white, and only 20.7 percent black" (pp. 364-65). And
when we look beyond crime definition and prison incarceration to the
ultimate bodily punishment - death - Kennedy points to consider-
able evidence that the modern system of capital punishment is not
7 Kennedy is quoting William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-194o:
A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 56 (1976).
8 Kennedy draws this quote from Cohen, cited above in note 7, at 56.
9 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.,
21 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(I)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1997).
11 See id. § 8 4 1(b)(i)(A)(ii).
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color-blind in its effects: all other things being equal, those who kill
white victims are far more likely to be sent to death than those who
kill blacks (pp. 328-33 & n.5i).
But this is only half of the picture, Kennedy argues. In antebellum
America, even free blacks were typically ineligible to vote, to hold leg-
islative office, to serve on a jury, and to sit on the bench. The Fif-
teenth Amendment (formally) changed all of that, and over the last
thirty years, America has begun to make good on the true promise of
that Amendment. As a result of Congress's transformative Voting
Rights Act of 196512 (made possible in part by earlier decades of
Southern black migration to Northern states where black citizens
wielded more political clout), blacks now vote and hold elective office
everywhere in America. At the federal level, the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 196813 ensures that blacks are part of federal jury pools;
at the state level, Supreme Court doctrine has helped spur states to
abandon the "key-man" system, in which local jury commissioners had
vast discretion to tap the "best" citizens for jury service and to keep
blacks off venires. 14 As a result of Supreme Court decisions rendered
in the last dozen years, neither a prosecutor nor a defendant is legally
entitled to use peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors because
of their race.' s African-American judges now sit on most courts in the
country. Urban police departments, long viewed in minority commu-
nities as "colonial" and "occupying" forces (pp. 27, 115), are beginning
to change their complexion:
By the end of the I98os, the number of African-American police chiefs
had increased to 13o, and they served in six of the nation's largest cities
(Baltimore, New York, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Houston).
This unprecedented phenomenon in American history represented a x8o-
degree change from the second-class status that African-Americans had
traditionally held in American law enforcement (p. 3oI n.*).16
In short, the key institutions driving the criminal justice system are no
longer white-dominated in the same way that they have been for most
of American history. Indeed, many black citizens today believe in get-
ting tough on crime and (if necessary) in building more prisons to per-
mit longer sentences; many black lawmakers have supported and even
spearheaded the war on drugs and the special criminal crusade on
crack; many black jurors have been participants in the system that has
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-I973bb (1994).
13 28 U.S.C. §§ i86-i869, 187X (i994).
14 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 501 (i977) (holding that racially underrepre-
sentative grand juries generated by a key-man system violate equal protection); Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 339-40 (1970) (affirming an injunction that required jury clerks to stop
excluding African-Americans from jury rolls).
Is See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57-
59 (1992).
16 Kennedy is quoting W. MARVIN DULANEY, BLACK POLICE IN AMERICA 102 (I9g6).
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led to high black incarceration rates; the most prominent black jurist
in America, Justice Clarence Thomas, is hardly soft on crime, and it
appears that his stance is in line with that of many, many African-
Americans today.
All of these facts lead to what is perhaps Kennedy's biggest point:
[B]lacks have suffered more from being left unprotected or underprotected
by law enforcement authorities than from being mistreated as suspects or
defendants, although it is allegations of the latter that now typically re-
ceive the most attention.
... In deciding whether rights have been infringed, . .. courts should
be careful to avoid conflating the interests of a subdivision of blacks -
black suspects, defendants, or convicts - with the interests of blacks as a
whole.
Like many social disasters, crime afflicts African-Americans with a
special vengeance; at most income levels, they are more likely to be raped,
robbed, assaulted, and murdered than their white counterparts.... More
striking is that whereas white victimization rates declined as income in-
creased, black victimization rates rose at the higher income levels....
Thus, at the center of all discussions about racial justice and criminal law
should be a recognition that black Americans are in dire need of protec-
tion against criminality. A sensible strategy of protection should include
efforts to ameliorate the social ills that contribute to criminality, including
poverty, child abuse, and the deterioration of civic agencies of social sup-
port. A sensible strategy of protection should also include, however, ef-
forts aimed toward apprehending, incapacitating, deterring, and punishing
criminals.
[.. The principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to
criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws
(pp. X, 11-12 & n.*, 19).
Once again, Kennedy traces the origins of the problem (in this case,
underprotection rather than overenforcement) to slave days:
The racial policy of withholding protection from blacks has its roots in
slavery.... Part of the strategy for denigrating all blacks involved de-
priving them of legal protections against conduct that was deemed crimi-
nal when visited upon whites. Hence, in the slave South (the locus of the
great mass of the black population in antebellum America), officials de-
criminalized violence inflicted upon blacks to the extent thought necessary
to assert and preserve white supremacy (p. 30).
A core purpose of the 1866 Equal Protection Clause was to affirm the
rights of black victims of crime; the central idea was not merely to
prevent the states from treating black criminal suspects, defendants,
and convicts worse than white ones, but also (and perhaps even more
1998] 1261
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emphatically) to guarantee that black victims of crime receive the
same protection as white victims. 17 Of course, things didn't quite
work out that way, and for the next hundred years, white-dominated
police forces, grand juries, and petit juries often contrived to look the
other way when blacks were victimized by crime - especially in the
South, where racist whites terrorized blacks in a regime marked by
lynchings and nooses and burning crosses (pp. 41-69).
But here too, Kennedy suggests that the current landscape is far
more complicated. As already noted, central institutions of the crimi-
nal justice system - legislatures, police departments, courts, juries -
now often include black voices and views. And blacks today are
hardly of one mind on these issues. (Nor are whites, or other racial
groups, for that matter.) Blacks are disproportionately criminal sus-
pects, defendants, and convicts on the one hand and criminal victims
on the other. Much of today's crime is intraracial - white-on-white
and black-on-black. Indeed, "four-fifths of violent crimes are commit-
ted by persons of the same race as their victims" (p. i9). And more
striking still: "In terms of misery inflicted by direct criminal violence,
blacks (and other people of color) suffer more from the criminal acts of
their racial 'brothers' and 'sisters' than they do from the racist mis-
conduct of white police officers" (p. 20). In support of this perspective,
Kennedy invokes Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 classic, An American Di-
lemma, and the influential 1968 Kerner Report:
Law-abiding Negroes point out that [criminal Negroes]... are a danger to
the Negro community. Leniency toward Negro defendants in cases in-
volving crimes against other Negroes is thus actually a form of discrimina-
tion (p. 70 (omission in original)).' 8
The strength of ghetto feelings about hostile police conduct may even be
exceeded by the conviction that ghetto neighborhoods are not given ade-
quate police protection.
... [S]urveys have reported that Negroes in Harlem and South Central
Los Angeles mention inadequate protection more often than brutality and
harassment as a reason for their resentment toward the police (p. 7I (omis-
sion in original)).19
Kennedy also points to more recent poll data:
[Professor Paul] Butler exudes keen sympathy for nonviolent drug of-
fenders and similar criminals. By contrast, Butler is inattentive to the as-
pirations, frustrations, and fears of law-abiding people compelled by cir-
17 See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW passim (1965) (documenting this
historical purpose).
18 Kennedy is quoting i GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 551 (1944).
19 Kennedy is quoting the 1988 version of THE KERNER REPORT: THE 1968 REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 307 (1988).
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cumstances to live in close proximity to the criminals for whom he is
willing to urge subversion of the legal system. Butler simply overlooks the
sector of the black law-abiding population that desires more rather than
less prosecution and punishment for all types of criminals. According to
data collected by a 1993 Gallup Poll, 82 percent of the blacks surveyed
believed that the courts in their area do not treat criminals harshly
enough; 75 percent favored putting more police on the streets to combat
crime; and 68 percent favored building more prisons so that longer sen-
tences could be given. One would never know from Butler's analysis that
a large number of ordinary, grass-roots blacks embrace such views (pp.
305-06 (citation omitted)).
What follows from all this? First, Kennedy suggests that we
should hesitate to label a policy "racist" merely because it hurts some
blacks, because such a policy may simultaneously help other blacks,
who (along with nonblacks) may well have supported the law for le-
gitimate, nonracist reasons. A crackdown on crack hurts (largely
black) crack users but may help their (largely black) law-abiding
neighbors and may help save a (perhaps largely black) group of young-
sters from falling prey to dealers of this devastating drug. Thus, Pro-
fessor Kennedy rebukes Professor Butler for describing the crack-
powder sentencing disparity as an example of "racism":
[O]ne would never suspect from [Butler's] account that when the federal
law that [Butler] criticizes was enacted, Charles Rangel, the African-
American representative from Harlem, chaired the House Select Commit-
tee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and voted in favor of this law as did
about half of the members of the Congressional Black Caucus (p. 301).
Another example of the racial complexity of our current condition
comes from the debate about racial justice in the administration of the
death penalty. Because much murder is black-on-black, to insist that
the death penalty be imposed on those who murder blacks with the
same statistical likelihood as on those who murder whites could well
mean that more black defendants are doomed to die at the hand of the
state.
Second, Kennedy's narrative shows special sympathy for the inno-
cent. On this point, the tradeoff between (disproportionately black)
criminal defendants and victims dissolves - neither group is well
served by a criminal justice machine that devours the innocent. Ken-
nedy reminds readers that, initially, the NAACP under Thurgood Mar-
shall represented only defendants whom the organization believed to
be innocent (p. 2o). Kennedy narrates with special passion the stories
of the Scottsboro Boys and other black defendants convicted and pun-
ished despite their evident innocence (ch. 3). And although he spends
less time on the matter, he hints at the need for strong measures to
protect the rights of innocent citizens victimized by police racism, as
exemplified by the infamous chokehold policy of the Los Angeles Po-




I suppose no review - even a rave - would be complete without a
quibble or two, so here goes. First, I wish that Professor Kennedy had
joined Justice Thurgood Marshall (and many others) in calling upon
the judiciary to eliminate the inherently invidious institution of the
peremptory challenge. Kennedy strides forcefully toward this conclu-
sion and then, at the very last moment, pulls up short. He powerfully
narrates the history of racial exclusion and discrimination in the
American jury system. In antebellum America, most states formally
barred blacks from the ballot box and the jury box. After Reconstruc-
tion, blacks won formal political rights, and thus informal mechanisms
of exclusion took over. Many states vested local officials with vast dis-
cretion to put together lists of suitable jurors from those citizens whom
they deemed sufficiently "upright," "intelligent," and of "good charac-
ter." Under this key-man system, few blacks were chosen. However,
in recent years, the key-man system has withered away - abolished at
the federal level by congressional statute in 1968 and largely aban-
doned by the states (with a little help from Supreme Court doctrine
stressing that juries should be drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community 2O). With jury lists now drawn randomly from voting rolls,
motor vehicle registration lists, and the like, the main locus of exclu-
sion has shifted to the courtroom itself. And here, as late as 1986 and
with the explicit blessing of the Supreme Court, both prosecutors and
defendants were allowed to veto, to blackball, an otherwise eligible
and proper juror simply because of the juror's skin color.21 Kennedy
rightly skewers the hypocritical reasoning offered in support of admit-
tedly race-based peremptory challenges:
The Reagan administration attacked race-based affirmative action on
color-blind grounds but supported permitting race-based peremptory
challenges as a tool of litigation.
[Justice] Rehnquist argued that [race-based peremptories] did not in-
vidiously discriminate against blacks because, after all, any person from
any group was subject to racially discriminatory strikes - whites, yellows,
reds, and browns as well as blacks. Rehnquist's argument is hauntingly
reminiscent of segregationist logic which reasoned that governmental bans
on interracial fornication, marriage, or transportation did not invidiously
discriminate against blacks because whites, too, were burdened by the
same laws (pp. 6-7, 207-o8).22
20 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 526-33 (1975).
21 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965).
22 For a similar critique of Justice Rehnquist's argument, see Akhil Reed Arnar & Jonathan L.
Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law AfterRodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REv. i, So n.246 (1995).
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Kennedy thus applauds the 1986 Batson v. Kentucky23 and the 1992
Georgia v. McCollum 24 decisions, which forbid the prosecution and the
defense, respectively, from keeping a citizen off of a jury simply be-
cause of her pigmentation (pp. 227-28).25
Having gone this far, Kennedy confronts the obvious next question:
won't many clever lawyers who want to win continue to use race as a
factor (perhaps the overwhelming factor) in their exercise of perempto-
ries but claim that their decisions are utterly color-blind? Kennedy
seems to admit that this will happen frequently but that it will be very
hard to prove in any given case. Thus, Kennedy casts his lot with
commentators who favor the total abolition of the peremptory chal-
lenge system - a system that, by its nature, invites arbitrariness,
stereotypes, and prejudice (p. 229). But then, at the end of the road,
Kennedy suddenly stops short and announces that judges "should not
... take it upon themselves to abolish the peremptory challenge" (p.
230). Why not? Formally and facially, the peremptory challenge sys-
tem per se is color-blind - but so was the key-man system. Kennedy
himself argues forcefully that judges should have abolished the key-
man system, and every one of his points seems to apply equally to the
peremptory challenge system:
I conclude that, as a prophylactic measure, the Supreme Court should
have invalidated the key-man system. First, the key-man system has a
baleful history in many locales. It has often been used as a device to ex-
clude people illicitly from the jury box. Second, the subjectivity of the cri-
teria used by the arbiters of the key-man system invites abuse. Third, the
legitimate aims of a key-man system can be obtained by procedures less
vulnerable to invidious manipulation. For example, if a state wants
knowledgeable jurors it can impose an objective test to screen for the
knowledge desired. At a certain point, a procedure becomes so subject to
corruption and so expensive to monitor that it should be adjudged incom-
patible with federal constitutional requirements (p. 184).
Elsewhere, I have tried to make the constitutional case against per-
emptories on grounds ranging far beyond the racial issues at the heart
of Kennedy's book,26 but here I am content to quibble with Kennedy
23 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
24 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
2S See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59.
26 See AKHIL REED AmAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 170-71 (1997); AKEmIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 64-78 (1998). The argument in these pages
sweeps beyond race and equal protection principles to encompass broader issues of democratic
representation, popular sovereignty, and constitutional structure. In my view, juries should repre-
sent the people, not the parties; the jury should function as the democratic lower house of a bi-
cameral judiciary in which judges sit as the upper house. The parties do not handpick the legisla-
ture that fashions laws, the grand jury that approves indictments, or the appellate bench that
pronounces the law; neither should the parties handpick the petit jury that sits in judgment. All
who vote should serve on juries, and each jury should strive to bring together diverse citizens -
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on his own terms. He suggests that peremptories can serve a useful
purpose in excluding truly oddball jurors - "three-dollar bills," in his
words (p. 230) - who might otherwise escape detection. But the same
could be said about the key-man system, and in principle, the for-cause
challenge is a much more carefully tailored and less invidious and ar-
bitrary device to deal with the problem. To illustrate, I turn a few
more of Kennedy's sentences (with my brackets) against Kennedy: "Af-
ter all, jury selection in the context of the adversary process is part of a
competition. The opposing attorneys do not simply want impartial
[nonoddball] jurors. They each want jurors who will give their side an
edge [and thus want to blackball other jurors, oddball or not]" (p. 219).
Kennedy also suggests that, after Batson, peremptories are not utterly
"unconstrained" (p. 23o), but surely this cannot be Kennedy's test. The
key-man system was never utterly "unconstrained" either - it was
subject to Court rules forbidding explicit racial discrimination. Yet
Kennedy himself rejects the idea that this formal (and hard-to-enforce)
constraint was constitutionally sufficient to save an inherently vicious
and invidious key-man system. Once again, why is the peremptory
challenge system any different?
At a couple of points, Kennedy uses language that suggests that he
may be especially sympathetic to peremptories in the hands of criminal
defendants rather than prosecutors (pp. 207, 228),27 but if so, this sym-
pathy seems at war with his own insights elsewhere in the book.
Giving defendants peremptories (many of which will predictably be
used in race-based or other invidious but hard-to-detect ways) will no
doubt help some innocent defendants, but so would a rule that man-
dated acquittals for defendants chosen in weekly lotteries. What we
need is an argument that peremptories are especially helpful to inno-
cent as opposed to guilty defendants, but Kennedy offers no such ar-
gument. In the absence of this argument, peremptories in the hands of
defendants, but not prosecutors, might indeed help (disproportionately
black) defendants - as would my hypothetical lottery. But what
about the (disproportionately black) victims of crime that Kennedy so
insistently urges us to remember?28
rich and poor, black and white, male and female, urban and rural - into a common conversation
affirming and nurturing a deliberative democracy.
27 Kennedy seems moderately sympathetic to a proposal to "strongly privilege-] the [criminal]
defendant's choice of venue" (p. 251). Would he support the choice of Klansmen to be tried in all-
white areas or the choice of white cops to be tried in Simi Valley? I wonder whether Kennedy's
tentative leanings on this point are fully consistent with his overall analytic argument and histori-
cal narrative.
28 To be sure, abolition of peremptories might require rethinking the rule of jury unanimity,
but once again, the same could be said about abolition of the key-man system. At one point,
Kennedy uses language that seems to link the issue of peremptories to unanimity (p. 228); else-
where, he chides Professor Butler for not considering how certain changes in jury practice might
lead to a rethinking of unanimity (p. 302). The unanimity issue is too large to be addressed in this
Review; my own views are set out in AMAR, cited above in note 26, at 175-77.
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A second quibble. Professor Kennedy endorses the result of the
1986 case Vasquez v. Hillery.29 I wonder. In 1962, a California grand
jury indicted Booker T. Hillery for what the Supreme Court itself de-
scribed as the "brutal murder" of a fifteen-year-old girl.30 At the time,
grand juries in this California county were handpicked by the sole su-
perior court judge - a kind of key-man system - and these grand ju-
ries invariably contained no blacks. Hillery was convicted in a jury
trial.31 More than twenty years later, his case reached the Supreme
Court on a writ of habeas corpus. 3 2 Hillery made no argument that
the trial itself was in any way racially improper or otherwise unfair or
unreliable.33 Instead,, he argued that, because the grand jury was ra-
cially stacked in an unconstitutional manner, it necessarily followed
that his conviction must be set aside.34 The Supreme Court agreed in
an opinion authored by Justice Marshall.3-
Assume for a moment, as does Kennedy, that the California key-
man system of grand jury selection in place in 1962 was unconstitu-
tional. Must the result be a rule of automatic reversal? Kennedy says
yes but admits that he is troubled by the idea of "offering to guilty de-
fendants the windfall of a new trial" (p. 187). He explains: "This pol-
icy does impose a heavy cost; the public pays dearly when persons who
have committed crimes delay, minimize, or evade punishment for rea-
sons having nothing to do with their culpability" (p. i88). We might
ask why a new trial would be such a "windfall" for "guilty defendants"
like Hillery, considering that they can be adjudged guilty again upon
retrial, but elsewhere Kennedy explains why retrials held many years
later often fail to convict the guilty "because of the accidents that af-
flict litigation: the dimming of memories, the death of witnesses, the
disappearance of physical evidence, and so on" (p. 276).
Why, then, does Kennedy support the Vasquez rule of automatic re-
versal and retrial? He supports it because such a rule will "deter fu-
ture constitutional violations, the same goal that primarily animates
the famous exclusionary rule" (p. 187). On other occasions, I have set
out my own critique of the exclusionary rule and the particular brand
of (in my view, often shoddy) deterrence logic associated with that
rule.36 But here, let me try to bracket as much of that as possible and
29 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
30 Id. at 255.
31 See id. at 256.
32 See id. at 256-57.
33 See id. at 256. Perhaps such an argument could have been made, but the Justices and Pro-
fessor Kennedy all proceed on the assumption that the trial itself was fair and constitutionally
flawless, and I do the same.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 264.
36 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 785-
8oo, 8ii-i6 (1994); AMAR, supra note 26, at 15o-6o; Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except
To Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations), 2o HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 457, 457-66 (1997);
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quibble with Kennedy on his own terms, as measured by his own ob-
servations. A scholar with such deep and heartfelt empathy for vic-
tims of crime, who is skeptical of "windfalls" for "guilty defendants"
who walk free, grinning, "for reasons having nothing to do with their
culpability," should think long and hard before embracing the "fa-
mous" exclusionary rule and seeking to extend its logic to other do-
mains. Other remedial approaches exist that lack some of the vicious
features of exclusion, 37 but Kennedy does not pay them sufficient heed.
Thus, he ends up endorsing an approach that fails to do justice to
some of his own deepest commitments and most penetrating insights.
Kennedy's "deterrence" one-liner has many other problems as ap-
plied to Vasquez. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
key-man system was ancient history in California - what exactly
would springing Hillery deter? Deterrence logic is future-oriented
rather than backward-looking; thus, it seems rather inapt on the facts
of Vasquez. Contrary to Kennedy's framing of the issue, perhaps Hil-
lery's best argument sounded in backward-looking corrective justice:
he was entitled to an indictment process free from racial discrimina-
tion and was denied this process. I return to this point momentarily,
but it is also worth noting that the unconstitutionality at issue in
Vasquez occurred at the hands of a judge, acting in good faith. If we
take seriously legal doctrine under the exclusionary rule that Kennedy
himself invokes, the logic of deterrence should only be deployed
against police officers and the like, not against judges themselves.
This is the explicit teaching of United States v. Leon 38: when judges
err, they should simply be told of their error by appellate courts, and
the law presumes that they will then go forth and sin no more.
39
This doctrinal difference between wrongs committed outside the
judicial system (say, by cops) and wrongs committed inside the system
(say, by judges) leads to another difference with important remedial
consequences. When a wrong has occurred outside the courtroom,
judges acting after the fact ordinarily cannot turn back the clock of
Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 53, 64, 71-72 (i996). Among my many arguments, I assert that the exclusionary rule does
violence to constitutional text, history, and structure; is in no way compelled by (and in fact of-
fends) general legal principles; has been conceptually undermined by the logic of important recent
cases; deters much less well than suitably crafted alternative remedies; fails to fit the analytic
scope of the constitutional violation; is "upside-down" in rewarding the guilty while doing nothing
for (or making worse off) the innocent; encourages erroneous "upside-down" thinking elsewhere in
constitutional criminal procedure; breeds popular contempt for the Fourth Amendment; inclines
judges to deny that the Fourth Amendment was violated in close (and not so close) cases; is insuf-
ficiently supple to address problems of over- and underdeterrence; and imposes savage demoral-
ization costs on identifiable victims of crime when they see grinning criminals walk free. (But
apart from all that, it is just fine.)
37 See AmAR, supra note 26, at 40-43, 15o-6o.
38 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
39 See id. at 916-17.
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time and "rerun" the world (say, by decreeing that cops "unsearch" a
wrongly searched house). But when a wrong has occurred within the
courtroom, judges can often "rerun" the judicial proceeding, this time
without the judicial mistake.
Now look one last time at Hillery's claim. His trial was (by hy-
pothesis) fair and proper, but his indictment was improper. Why
wouldn't an apt remedy - doing corrective justice to Hillery, "undo-
ing" the wrong, and emphatically affirming the constitutional unac-
ceptability of race discrimination - be to allow California to uphold
Hillery's conviction as long as the state simply reindicted Hillery (in
1986!) by a fairly selected grand jury? In this new grand jury pro-
ceeding, missing witnesses, stale evidence, and the like would probably
not be major problems, because the proceeding would not need to es-
tablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but only probable cause; and
the proceeding would not need to be constrained by hearsay rules and
other technical rules of evidence.40 The new grand jury could proba-
bly reach a fair verdict merely by reading the transcript of Hillery's
(fair) trial. Professor Kennedy never considers the possibility of rein-
dictment without retrial as an apt remedy in Vasquez, but such a re-
medy seems to fit well with many of the other things that he says in
his book.41
Of course all this is, as advertised, mere quibbling. Thus, I would
like to end as I began, with sincere words of praise and admiration.
Professor Kennedy has written a great and wise book.
40 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956).
41 Professor Kennedy does discuss an article by Professor Meltzer that analyzes the remedial
and deterrence issues raised by Vasquez and other cases (p. 188). In a footnote, Professor Meltzer
floats the notion of reindictment without retrial as a possible remedy, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Deter-
ring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials. Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 257 n.43 (1988); however, Meltzer does not pursue the
idea, and Kennedy does not mention it.
19981 1269
(COLOR) BLIND FAITH: THE TRAGEDY OF
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
Paul Butler*
When you don't know when you have been spit on, it does not matter too
much what else you think you know.
RUTH SHAYS1
I. INTRODUCTION: RANDALL KENNEDY - BETTER AND WORSE
Half of the young black men residing in Washington, D.C. - the
capital of the freest nation in the world - are in prison or under the
supervision of the criminal courts. 2 This ugly fact was reported a few
months after Randall Kennedy published Race, Crime, and the Law.3
The timing would occasion no regret from Professor Kennedy, however
- he all but ignored the equally bleak statistics that were available to
him at the time he was writing. As far as Kennedy is concerned, the
extraordinary rate of incarceration of African-Americans is not a racial
issue.
Reading Race, Crime, and the Law, which the white legal estab-
lishment has hailed as the seminal work on race and crime,4 it would
be hard to understand why many African-Americans believe they live
in a police state. Even upon careful examination of the book's 538
pages, one finds no citation to the extraordinary evidence: half of
prison inmates are black;s almost half of the women in state prison are
black;6 nationally, nearly one-third of young black men are either in
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. I thank my colleagues IV.
Burlette Carter and Ira Lupu for thoughtful comments that improved this Review. Michael Starr
provided exemplary research assistance.
I Ruth Shays, Ruth Shays, in DRYLONGSO: A SELF-PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA 27, 27
(John Langston Gwaltney ed., xg8o).
2 See ERIC R. LOTKE, NATIONAL CTR. ON INSTS. AND ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A
GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN WASHINGTON D.C.'s CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER I (1997).
3 See Cheryl W. Thompson, Young Blacks Entangled in Legal System, WASH..PosT, Aug. 26,
1997, atBI.
4 See Stuart Taylor Jr., Common Sense on Race and Crime, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 1997, at
29 (praising Race, Crime, and the Law as a "wise and penetrating new book" with lessons for both
liberals and conservatives); see also Chris Klein, Summertime Snooze: A Peek at Professors' (Seri-
ous) Reading Lists, NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1997, at A14 (noting that the book was at the top of many
law professors' summer reading lists).
5 See Fox Butterfield, More in U.S. Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. io, 1995,
atAi4.
6 See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON: SURVEY OF STATE




prison, on probation or parole, or awaiting trial;7 more young black
men are in prison than in college.8 One might think that those facts
would command substantial attention in a treatise that purports to
"recount, make vivid, and explain" the circumstances that cause Afri-
can-Americans to "perceive the criminal justice system with suspicion,
if not antagonism" (p. x).9 The book's author, however, seems to be-
lieve that they are irrelevant.
Kennedy claims, instead, that African-Americans who are con-
victed of crimes are "bad" blacks who should be carefully distin-
guished from "good Negroes" so that whites will not impute their mal-
feasance to the entire African-American community (p. 17).o
According to Kennedy, the more that law enforcement is directed at
African-Americans, the better off the African-American community is.
He cautions blacks seeking reform of the criminal justice system to
employ only those tactics that have whites' approval.
In this Review, space constraints force me to slight Race, Crime,
and the Law's praiseworthy historical exegesis in order to focus on
some substantial flaws in its analysis of present-day circumstances.
Kennedy's enthusiasm for the punishment of African-Americans is mis-
guided, as is his embrace of the value of color-blindness in the criminal
law.
The problem with Kennedy's analysis is that it insufficiently weighs
both the utility and the cost of the radical law enforcement that African-
7 See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (i995).
8 In 1994, approximately 678,3oo black males were incarcerated in state and federal prisons and
locals jails. See Black Males in College or Behind Bars in the United States, xpSo to '994,
POSTSECONDARY EDUC. OPPORTUNITY (Postsecondary Educ. Opportunity, Oskaloosa, Iowa), Mar.
1996, at 9. In the same year, 549,600 black males were enrolled in post-secondary educational institu-
tions. See id.; see also MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 8 (199o) (showing that, in 1989,
there were more young black men under criminal justice supervision than there were men of all ages
enrolled in higher education).
9 Indeed, Kennedy believes that he must explain why critics of racial bias in the criminal jus-
tice system, who are "relatively weak politically" and "marooned on the left end of the American
political spectrum" are worthy of his allocation of "considerable space and energy" (p.12). Ken-
nedy's conclusion is that his largess is warranted because these "marginal" people, who include
"the likes of Jesse Jackson, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and
the Congressional Black Caucus," do "exert considerable influence within African-American
communities" (p. 12).
10 1 use "bad" black and "good Negro" after Kennedy, who notes that the "urge to differentiate
between 'good' and 'bad' Negroes is an important feature of.. . 'the politics of respectability'" (p.
17), which he advocates. See infra Part I. Kennedy's differentiation is reminiscent of African-
American comedian Chris Rock's distinction between "black people" and "niggas." Rock professes
his "love" for black people, whom he characterizes as hard-working and self-sufficient, and his "hate"
for niggas, whom he suggests are welfare-dependent, irresponsible, and prone to crime. CHRIS ROCK,
Niggas vs. Black People, on ROLL WITH THE NEW (Dreamworks Records 1997); see also Faral




Americans experience. Race, Crime, and the Law rehearses, persua-
sively, one part of the racial critique of criminal justice: the criminal law
historically has not been administered in a color-blind fashion. Kennedy,
however, fails to comprehend the next point: embracing race neutrality
now would come at the expense of black people. Ostensibly color-blind
selection of whom to punish will perpetuate segregated prisons as surely
as ostensibly color-blind selection of whom to educate will return us to
segregated universities. I argue that no more compelling argument for
color-blindness exists in the former case than in the latter one.
As part of my methodology, I compare Randall Kennedy to Randall
Kennedy. Professor Kennedy has written persuasively about the folly
of color-blindness in the law. He has also warned of the danger of the
"celebratory tradition" of evaluating America's progress toward racial
justice." He published two important articles on these issues in
1986.12 Two years later, Professor Kennedy reviewed a Supreme Court
case in which the Court refused to find that a Georgia criminal statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause absent proof of purposeful dis-
crimination.' 3  Kennedy's criticism of the purposeful discrimination
standard was harsh: he complained of the requirement's "hopeless in-
adequacy as a tool for responding to racial oppression in its subtle mod-
em guises.' 4 But what a difference a decade makes. Now, writing
about criminal law, Kennedy embraces the same color-blindness that
he earlier believed would doom African-Americans.
We therefore uncover substantial disagreement between the two
Randalls on such matters as the necessity of government race-
consciousness, the importance of examining racial consequences, and
the role that white backlash should play in moderating the legal and
political strategies of African-Americans.'5 I identify the Kennedy
11 Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Profes-
sor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (I986).
12 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986); Kennedy, supra note ii.
13 See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, ioi HARv. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
'4 Id. at 1419.
15 Professor David Cole also has noticed a dichotomy between Kennedy's recent writing about
crime and some of his earlier scholarship. See David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A
Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 GEO. LJ. 2547, 2550 (I995) (stating
that "Kennedy has previously advanced sharp and persuasive critiques of the intent requirement"
but that he "now [in Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1995)] abandons that critique and defends the intent require-
ment"). Kennedy's response to Cole was that "[his] thinking ha[d] indeed evolved since [he] wrote
those earlier pieces." Randall Kennedy, A Response to Professor Cole's "Paradox of Race and
Crime", 83 GEO. L.J. 2573, 2578 (1995). Other writings by Kennedy further evidence this "evolu-
tion." See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745
(1989) (criticizing critical race theory). The right to change one's mind is the prerogative of any
scholar. Should I deviate from strong views that I have published, I hope that I, like Kennedy,
will have the courage to admit it. In this Review, I contrast Kennedy's earlier articles with his
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whose scholarship supports the racial critiques as "Randall the Race
Man."'16 I refer to Race, Crime, and the Law's Kennedy, who admits to
valuing specially the esteem of white people, as "Respectable Randall."17
Part II of this Review asserts that many of Race, Crime, and the
Law's flaws rest in Kennedy's faith in the "politics of respectability." I
argue that, contrary to Respectable Randall's belief, this politics fails -
both as a mode of analysis of racial injustice and as a means for achiev-
ing racial justice. Part I concludes this Review with a lamentation
about the loss of an important opportunity. Kennedy is probably the
most influential African-American legal scholar. People in a position
to make a difference in the fate of half of the young black men in the
District of Columbia would surely listen to his prescription. Ken-
nedy's response - "just don't confuse them with me" - is worse than
irresponsible.
II. Two PRINCIPLES OF HIGHLY RESPECTABLE NEGROES
In the first chapter of Race, Crime, and-the Law, Kennedy explains
that his analysis is informed by the "New Politics of Respectability"
(pp. 12-28). The basic tenet of this politics is that it is important for
blacks to prove that they "are capable of meeting the established moral
standards of white middle-class Americans" (p. I7). Kennedy posits
that two "core intuitions" of this tenet are important to the study of race
and crime. First, "the principle injury suffered by African-Americans in
relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforce-
ment of the laws" (p. 19). According to this intuition, "more burdensome
[than the racist administration of criminal justice] now in the day-to-day
lives of African-Americans are private, violent criminals (typically black)
who attack those most vulnerable without regard to racial identity" (p.
ig). Second, in improving criminal justice, blacks should choose tactics
that elicit "respect and sympathy rather than fear and anger" (p. 2 I).
When blacks have been inconsiderate of white sensibilities - when,
for example, they publicly displayed approval of the acquittal of a
current work not to expose him as a hypocrite, but rather to demonstrate that, on the merits, he
should not have changed his mind. The earlier writings help make my case, because in addition
to their superior analysis, they are eloquent and passionate.
16 "Race man" is a term of art in the African-American community. It refers to those who are
"zealots about what we must do to uplift the Negro race." Leon Forrest, Ralph Ellison Remem-
bered, CM. TalB., Apr. 24, 1994, § 14, at 3 (describing Ellison as a race man whose vision was to
"(a]ttack racism and build [both] within the race [and] within the individual"); see also Breena
Clarke & Susan Tifft, A "Race Man" Argues for a Broader Curriculum, TIME, Apr. 22, i99i, at
16, 16 (containing an interview with self-proclaimed race man Henry Louis Gates, Jr., who defines
the title as a "person of letters who writes about African-American culture"). Today, Kennedy
certainly would reject the title "Race Man." In a recent essay, Kennedy states that "[n]either ra-
cial pride nor racial kinship offers guidance that is intellectually, morally, or politically satisfac-
tory." Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem - And Ours, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1997, at 55,
55.
17 See my discussion of the "politics of respectability" below in Part IL
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black criminal defendant, even though they knew the verdict would be
unpopular among whites - they have "adversely affected the racial
reputation of African-Americans, facilitating indifference to their
plight" (p. 21).
Kennedy uses the politics of respectability as the primary instrument
in his examination of race, crime, and the law. He believes that this in-
strument helps him diagnose when there is disease and when there is
only hypochondria. He thinks that it helps him recommend the appro-
priate medicine. Unfortunately, the instrument does not work - it fa-
cilitates misdiagnosis, and its prescriptions do not improve the health of
the patient Respectable Randall is, alas, a quack.
In this Part, I describe two arguments about race and crime that
Kennedy makes from the politics of respectability, and explain why these
arguments fail. The arguments - which I term "two principles of
highly respectable Negroes" - are that punishment directed at "bad
Negroes" is good for the black community and that African-American
strategies for advancement should be circumscribed by the threat of
white backlash. I hope to demonstrate that the racial critics to whom
these arguments are addressed are more thoughtful - and more persua-
sive - than Kennedy allows. Their analysis helps us to see race more
clearly in the criminal law and to recommend more effective cures.
A. Principle I: The Respectable Negro Is Uplifted When the Bad
Black Is Punished
One of the strategies of the politics of respectability "is to distance as
many blacks as far as possible from negative stereotypes used to justify
racial discrimination against all Negroes" (p. 17). Kennedy claims that
there exists a "deeply rooted impulse in African-American culture to dis-
tinguish sharply between 'good' and 'bad' Negroes." (p. 17).18 In the
criminal context, Kennedy is happy to make this distinction, because no
one - not lynch mobs or brutal police officers or false accusers or white
supremacist jurors or hanging judges - enrages Kennedy as much as
"private, violent criminals (typically black)" (p. 17). Time and again,
Race, Crime, and the Law proclaims that blacks "suffer more from the
18 Kennedy does not provide any citation to support his broad assertion about black culture. The
well-known Negro colloquial usage of the word "bad" to denote "good" might cast some doubt on
Kennedy's claim. Indeed, Kennedy himself seems of two minds on the issue: only a few pages after
noting the "deeply rooted impulse" to isolate bad blacks (p. 17), Kennedy suggests that many African-
Americans embrace the "bad black" criminal (pp. 26-27). He states that "a substantial number" of
blacks identify with or admire black outlaws: "Precisely how many is difficult to say. That the num-
bers are significant, however, is clear" (pp. 26-27). He also quotes with approval Gunnar Myrdal's
observation that solidarity among African-Americans "develops easily in the Negro group, a solidarity
against the law and the police," and that the "arrested Negro often acquires the prestige of a victim, a
martyr, or a hero, even when he is simply a criminal" (p. 24). Kennedy notes that, although Myrdal
wrote several decades ago, "[niow, at the close of the twentieth century, despite notable reforms, this
dynamic is still at work" (p. 25).
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criminal acts of their racial 'brothers' and 'sisters' than they do from [of-
ficial racism]" (p. 20). Indeed, "[r]acist white cops, however vicious," are
only "minor irritants" when compared to "the black gangs" (p. 2o).19
Accept, for the purpose of analysis, Kennedy's bizarre perception that
it is important to compare the injury that African-Americans experience
from white racists with the injury that they experience from black
criminals. For the same purpose, assume that his calibration is correct:
that African-Americans suffer more from the latter injury than from the
former. Even with these premises, the case cannot be made for Ken-
nedy's wholesale enthusiasm for the punishment of all those blacks
whom the law calls "bad."
One problem is Kennedy's fallacious assumption of a positive corre-
lation between law enforcement and public safety. The vast majority of
punishment in the United States is not directed at people who are guilty
of the violent crime that is Kennedy's primary concern. Indeed, only
three in one hundred arrests in the United States are for serious violent
crimes. 20  Approximately eighty-nine percent of federal prisoners, and
the majority of state prisoners, are incarcerated for nonviolent offenses1.2
In California, more people have been imprisoned under the "three strikes
law" for marijuana possession than for murder, rape, and kidnapping
combined.22
A lack of correlation between most law enforcement and public
safety does not prove, however, the charge of the racial critics: that
criminal justice is infected with racism. To support this charge, racial
critics begin, as Race, Crime, and the Law does, with the past. The
most informative chapters of Race, Crime, and the Law are the two
that begin with the word "History." In Chapter 2, "History: Unequal
Protection," Kennedy recounts several episodes in which the American
criminal justice system has been, in the familiar pun, "just-us" -
apartheid justice for white people (pp. 29-75). His thesis is that, his-
torically, African-Americans have lacked the "protection" of criminal
law because violence against them - by whites or other blacks - has
not been punished (p. 29).23 In Chapter 3, "History: Unequal En-
19 Kennedy is quoting Jerry G. Watts, Reflections on the Rodney King Verdict and the Para-
doxes of the Black Response, in READING RODNEY KING: READING URBAN UPRISING 244 (Rob-
ert Gooding-Williamns ed., 1993).
20 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRaIMNAL JUSTICE
COMMIsSION 9 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter REAL WAR ON CreMEI. The term "seri-
ous violent crimes" refers to crimes of violence causing injury. See id.
21 See id. at 17.
22 See Greg Krikorian, Wilson Hails Results of "3 Strikes," LA. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at BI, B3
(describing a 1996 study that found 192 second or third strikes for possession of marijuana, compared
with 40 for murder, 25 for rape, and 24 for kidnapping).
23 Because Kennedy relies upon utilitarian justifications for punishment, it would have been
helpful for him at least to acknowledge the academic debate about whether law can deter vio-
lence. See Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, CRMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 115-
ig (6th ed. 1995).
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forcement," Kennedy tells stories of discrimination against Negroes in-
volved in the criminal justice process (pp. 76-135). The cumulative
teaching of these chapters is that American criminal justice is rooted in
white supremacy.
The past, however, is not prologue for Respectable Randall. Ken-
nedy and contemporary racial critics part ways over Kennedy's belief
that racism in the criminal justice system is largely a thing of the past.
Racial critics argue vehemently that white supremacy still taints the
administration of criminal justice in this country Currently, their most
frequently cited example is the disparity, in federal criminal law, be-
tween the punishment of crack cocaine offenders and the punishment
of powder cocaine offenders. (Crack cocaine is created by cooking
powder cocaine with baking soda.) Debate exists over which, if either,
form of cocaine is more harmful.
In Chapter io, "Race, Law, and Punishment: The War on Drugs,"
Kennedy explores and disputes the charge that the sentencing disparity
is racist (pp. 351-86). He describes the legal basis of the disparity:
Under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, a person convicted of
possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine
must be sentenced to no less than ten years in prison. By contrast, only if
a person is convicted of possession with intent to distribute at least 5,ooo
grams of powder cocaine is he subject to a mandatory minimum [sentence]
of ten years - a ioo:i ratio in terms of intensity of punishment. Moreo-
ver, under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, a person caught
merely possessing one to five grams of crack cocaine is subject to a man-
datory minimum sentence of five years in prison. Crack cocaine is the
only drug for which there exists a mandatory minimum penalty for a first
offense of simple possession (p. 364 (citations omitted)).
Racial critics would argue that this punishment scheme belongs in
Kennedy's chapter on the unequal enforcement of laws against Afri-
can-Americans. Their primary evidence is, again, statistical and is fo-
cused on the skewed effect of the crack laws. In 1993, for example,
blacks were 88.3% of federal crack distribution convictions, and
whites were only 4.I%.24 In that same year, 32% of federal powder
distribution defendants were white, and 27.4% were black.25 Analysts
for the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics offered
some explanation:
Because the imprisonment rate for crack was 99%, the overall imprison-
ment rates for blacks convicted of trafficking in all kinds of cocaine was
higher than for whites. And because the sentences for crack were so much
longer than for powdered cocaine (approximately twice as long), the aver-




age sentences given to all black traffickers were longer than those given to
whites.2 6
Kennedy does not necessarily support the sentencing disparity, but
he is exercised by the idea that it is racist. He does not necessarily be-
lieve that the law is good - indeed, it might even be "silly" - but he
steadfastly holds that the law is racially benign.2 7 Given the history of
white supremacist criminal law that Kennedy details in Chapters 2
and 3, we must question the sense of his color-blind faith in a law that
has extraordinarily different consequences for white people and black
people.
"[W]hat is racially discriminatory about the crack-powder distinc-
tion?" Kennedy wonders (p. 375). His argument is twofold: first, no
evidence demonstrates that Congress intended to discriminate against
African-Americans in creating the distinction;2s second, locking up
black crack dealers probably helps, not harms, the black community.2 9
The only person burdened by the law is the bad black (pp. 11, 375-
76).30
First consider why we should care about the sentencing disparity
even though Kennedy finds no evidence of purposeful discrimination.
From a moral perspective - as opposed to a legal one - lack of evi-
dence of discriminatory intent is not dispositive proof that a law is ra-
cially just. Randall the Race Man reminded us that "[r]acial subordina-
tion ... can be maintained without discrete, episodic, affirmative actions
of purposeful discrimination."31 He noted: "Indeed it can be more se-
curely entrenched by habitual patterns of actions and inaction that inflict
harms upon blacks without any intentional design whatsoever."3 2 In
other words, victims are injured by the effect of law, not the purpose of
26 DOUGLAS C. McDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? 93 (1993).
27 "There is an important difference between saying that a policy is wrong, or misguided, or
mistaken, or imprudent, or even silly and saying that a policy is 'racist'" (p. 352).
28 Kennedy writes that racial critics have problems with "the proper interpretation of statis-
tics" and that they "seem unaware that a racial disparity is not necessarily indicative of a racial
discrimination" (p. 9).
29 Early in the book, Kennedy asks whether "the black population [is] hurt when traffickers in
crack cocaine suffer longer prison sentences than those who deal in powdered cocaine" or whether
"[it is] helped by incarcerating for longer periods those who use and sell a drug that has had an
especially devastating effect on African-American communities" (p. io). Later, he answers these
questions with the assertion that prison is "a burden for those imprisoned and a good for those
whose lives are bettered by the confinement of criminals who might otherwise prey upon them"
(P. 375).
30 "To the extent that the enhanced punishment for crack offenses fails upon blacks, it fails not
upon blacks as a class but only upon a distinct subset of the black population - those in violation
of the crack law" (p. 376).




law.33 Therefore, victims ought to care more about eradicating the effect
than about comprehending the purpose. If there is a monkey on my
back - but not on my neighbor's back - I seek to remove the monkey.
I do not need to know why the monkey has attacked me, and not my
neighbor, in order to assess the wisdom of removing it (although I might
have a clue if, historically, monkeys have attacked people like me and
not people like my neighbor). I do not need to prove the monkey's in-
tention to understand that I am freer without the monkey than with it.
Alas, for the legal challenge, if not the moral one, I must prove pur-
poseful discrimination. Randall the Race Man harshly criticized this re-
quirement - its "great failing ... is its hopeless inadequacy as a tool for
responding to racial oppression in its subtle modem guises" 34 - but it is
the law. Sometimes the Supreme Court has found the moral analysis I
describe above - the focus on effect - to be dispositive on the issue of
purpose. In these cases, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,35 Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,36 and Shaw v. Reno,3 7 the Court divines purpose through an
examination of consequence. Indeed, this principle, at least as a starting
point for analysis, has the authority of the Equal Protection Clause in
the law of jury selection.38
In the case of the federal cocaine law, however, the Court has been
unwilling to correlate intent with effect.3 9 How, then, can one prove dis-
criminatory purpose, especially considering the Race Man's insightful
teaching on "the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt unobtru-
sively to new surroundings and, further, to hide itself even from those
firmly within its grip",?4 0
Michael Tonry suggests that we may infer malign purpose from the
fact that Congress was aware of the disparate effect that the harsh drug
sentences would have on African-Americans, and enacted them none-
theless.41 Tonry analogizes to the law's concept of "knowledge" for the
purposes of criminal responsibility.42 In many jurisdictions and, notably,
under the Model Penal Code, a person is as culpable for a mind state of
knowledge as she is if her mental element is purpose. Race, Crime, and
the Law does not directly confront this argument, despite Kennedy's ac-
33 But cf. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 1o6
YALE L.. 2505, 2536 (1997) (arguing that majority-minority electoral districts cause "expressive
harms" to whites).
34 Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1419.
3S ii8 U.S. 356 (1886).
36 364 U.S. 339 (i6o).
37 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
38 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) C'Proof of systematic exclusion from the
venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the 'result bespeaks discrimination.'").
39 See United States v. Armstrong, ii6 S. Ct. 148o, 1487 (r996).
40 Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1419.
41 See MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
4 (995).
42 See id. at 4-5.
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knowledgment of Tonry as a "leading liberal expert on sentencing" (p.
23). Respectable Randall surely would dissent, however, given his reluc-
tance to see discrimination absent the smoking gun. He would argue
that the failure to remediate the effect on the black person is different
from the intent to hurt her. The Race Man, though, was not so obtuse:
"racially oppressive official action" occurs at "deeper layers" not when
"decision makers have designs against blacks," but when "decisionmak-
ers leave blacks out of their designs."43 Would Congress establish a law,
or the President enforce a policy, that would result in the criminal super-
vision of one out of every three young white men? The answer is no.
The costs - political, economic, social - would be too high.
The Race Man offered another method of proof of purposeful dis-
crimination that is relevant to the cocaine sentencing scheme. In a 1986
article about whether opposition to affirmative action is racist, Randall
Kennedy recommended the epistemology of considering the source of
the opposition.44 Kennedy was critical of the view that the debate
about affirmative action occurs "in the context of an overriding com-
mitment to racial fairness and equality shared by all the important
participants in the debate."4s The problem with this approach, ac-
cording to Kennedy, was that, although "[i]t concedes the presence of
prejudice 'out there' in the workaday world of ordinary citizens," it
"assumes that 'in here' - in the realm of scholarly discourse and the
creation of public policy - prejudice plays no role. '46
To demonstrate this point, Kennedy examined the motives of the
Reagan administration in opposing affirmative action. This is the
same Reagan administration that created the war on drugs that has
produced the grossly disproportionate incarceration of African-
Americans and the crack-powder distinction. Randall the Race Man
noted that skepticism about Reagan's goodwill toward blacks was jus-
tified:
[Reagan had a] long history of suspect views on racial issues. His active
opposition to racial distinctions benefitting Negroes is not matched by
analogous opposition to racial distinctions harming Negroes. Indeed, a
43 Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1419.
44 See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1341. Kennedy's analysis of the source of the crack-powder
distinction emphasizes the role of African-American legislators in supporting the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, which mandated the ioo:i disparity (p. 370). But almost as many black legislators voted
against the law as for it (p. 370). Even focusing on the black congressmen quoted by Kennedy,
none argued for a distinction between crack and powder, but rather that cocaine offenses be pun-
ished more severely (pp. 371-72). Most of these black legislators now disavow support for the
harsh disparity. See, e.g., Charles B. Rangel, Letters to the Editor: Crack Law Is Biased and
Flawed, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1997, at A23 ("Despite the fact that I originally supported the crack
sentencing legislation, I now recognize that its application has revealed a strongly biased and
flawed statute. My strong advocacy against drug trafficking and abuse does not blind me from
my responsibility to correct failed policy, no matter the author.").
4S Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1337.
46 Id. at 1338-39.
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strikingly consistent feature of President Reagan's long political career is
his resistance to practically every major political effort to eradicate racism
or to contain its effects. 47
Strikingly consistent, indeed - and the war on drugs is part and
parcel of the consistency. Alternative explanations exist, but those ex-
planations disregard "the political milieu in which debate over affirma-
tive action and other racial policies has been waged over the past dec-
ade - a period during which there has been a discernible attenuation
of public commitment to racial justice and, even more troubling, a
startling reemergence of overt racial animosity."48
Respectable Randall defends the criminal justice system against the
charge that it unfairly burdens African-Americans by claiming that it
only encumbers the bad blacks who commit crime and not the good Ne-
groes who constitute the majority of the African-American community.
Unfortunately, even if we accept Kennedy's criteria for good and bad,
it is getting harder and harder to know which group is larger. In the
young male population of some urban communities, "bad" blacks seem
to be more numerous than good ones.49 Moreover, if the incarceration
of black men continues to increase at the current rate, the majority of
African-American men between the ages of eighteen and forty will be
incarcerated by the year 2010.50 Kennedy's view is that a particular
law burdens a group only when the law burdens the majority of that
group. Presumably, he would advise racial critics to delay their com-
plaints for another twelve years, until most African-American men are
incarcerated.
But in the meantime, the cost of so much law enforcement - par-
ticularly incarceration - is severe. It contributes to the growing legal
disenfranchisement of African-Americans, to the poverty of children, and
to the breakup of the family. One in seven black men of voting age is
disenfranchised because of a criminal record.5' Their incarceration sig-
nificantly decreases their earning potential.s2 Incarceration, by making a
large number of black males unavailable or undesirable, contributes to
the relatively low male-to-female ratio among African-Americans. This
47 Id. at 1342.
48 Id. at 1344 (emphasis added).
49 One study found that, in Baltimore, Maryland, 56% of the African-American males between
the ages of 18 and 35 were "under criminal justice supervision on any given day in iggi." See
NATIONAL CTR. ON INSTS. AND ALTERNATIVES, HOBBLING A GENERATION: YOUNG AFRICAN
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF AMERICA'S CITIES: BALTIMORE,
MARYLAND I (1992). In Washington, D.C., half of all young black males are under government
supervision. See supra p. 1270.
50 See Butterfield, supra note 5.
51 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: STATE
RACIAL DisPARriTEs IN IMPRISONMENT 12 (997).




community has the lowest such ratio of all American ethnic groups, 53 a
factor correlated with its higher rate of unwed births.5 4 Families are
significantly disrupted when a parent is incarcerated. Sixty percent of
male inmates have children, mostly under the age of eighteen.55 Chil-
dren of incarcerated parents perform worse in school and are much more
likely to be incarcerated later in life.S6
Kennedy undervalues the role that race plays in creating the bad
black and in selecting him for punishment. He believes that the best
explanation for disproportionate black incarceration is disproportion-
ate black criminality. For him, that seems to be the beginning and the
end of the debate about the racial consequences of criminal justice.
This way of thinking is flawed in two important respects. First, Ken-
nedy ignores significant evidence about the selective enforcement of
drug laws in African-American communities. 57 Second, even if blacks
are disproportionately criminal, that fact is not racially neutral.
Blacks do not commit crimes because they are black. Indeed, the best
explanation of disproportionate black criminality is white racism.58
Kennedy fails to comprehend that the same environmental factors that
the civil law recognizes as the cause of substandard black achievement
deserve recognition in the criminal law. In an article making the case
for affirmative action in criminal law, I note that "[t]he exhortation to
'obey the law' should not end the legal and moral response to the black
criminal any more than 'study harder' should end the response to the
minority college applicant with lower standardized test scores." 9
Randall the Race Man knew about the folly of color-blind analysis of
low achievement by African-Americans. I think that he would recognize
about "demerit" in criminal law what he recognized about "merit" in
civil law: "it is a malleable concept, determined not by immanent, pre-
53 See David T. Courtwright, The Drug War's Hidden Toll, IssuEs IN So. & TECH., Winter
1996-1997, at 7', 73.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 74.
56 See Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family Affair" - The Incarceration of the
American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 281-82 (1994).
57 According to government statistics, African-Americans, who comprise 12% of the popula-
tion, account for only 13% of drug users, yet make up 74% of those incarcerated for drug use. See
Pierre Thomas, r in 3 Young Black Men in Justice System: Criminal Sentencing Policies Cited in
Study, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at Ai (describing this study). The drug statistics provide an
interesting proof of one of the tenets of the politics of respectability - that blacks are as capable
as whites of meeting white middle-class standards of morality. But these statistics also indicate
that blacks who fail to meet these standards are more likely than whites to be punished.
58 Kennedy does not propose that blacks are genetically prone to crime, but rather states that,
"[g]iven the deprivations blacks have faced, it should come as no surprise that, relative to their
proportion of the population, blacks are more likely than whites to commit street crimes" (pp. 23-
24).




existing standards but rather by the perceived needs of society."60 I
think he would cite the argument for a "principle of antisubjugation
rather than antidiscrimination." 61 The great civil rights cases, he
stated, "forged by the gritty particularities of the struggle against white
racism, stand for the proposition that the Constitution prohibits any
arrangements imposing racial subjugation - whether such arrange-
ments are ostensibly race-neutral or even ostensibly race-blind." 62
Now, unfortunately, Respectable Randall reminds me of those whom
the Race Man condemned because they "insist on deference [to color-
blindness] no matter what its effects upon the very group the four-
teenth amendment was created to protect.163
B. Principle II: The Respectable Negro Is "Extra-Careful" Not To
Upset Whites
Respectable Randall is greatly concerned with the racial critics' lack
of concern for white people's feelings. From the politics of respectabil-
ity, he cautions:
[Flor a stigmatized racial minority, successful efforts to move upward in
society must be accompanied at every step by a keen attentiveness to the
morality of means, the reputation of the group, and the need to be extra-
careful in order to avoid the derogatory charges lying in wait in a hostile
environment (p. 20).
For example, after O.J. Simpson's acquittal, blacks should not have
engaged in "triumphalist celebrations," because "such displays would
singe the sensibilities of many, particularly whites" (p. 2 1). Kennedy's
concern is that "[ajcting based on the notion that blacks need not be
attuned to the way they are perceived by others has adversely affected
the racial reputation of African-Americans, facilitating indifference to
their plight" (p. 2 1).
Fear of white backlash guides some of Respectable Randall's opposi-
tion to black power in the form of jury nullification. I have proposed
that African-American jurors consider acquitting blacks who are guilty
of nonviolent, victimless crimes, such as drug possession. 64 The pro-
60 Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1333.
61 Id. at 1336.
62 Id. (footnote omitted).
63 Id. at 1335-36.
64 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, io5 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (995) [hereinafter Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification].
Kennedy has other concerns about jury nullification: that it will not improve conditions in the black
community and that it is premised on an unduly pessimistic view of American criminal justice (pp.
295-3io). Kennedy states that "one-dimensional condemnations of the racial situation in America
render[] attractive certain subversive proposals [such as racially selective jury nullification] that are,
given actual conditions, foolish, counterproductive, and immoral" (p. 389). I have addressed else-
where concerns about the effectiveness of nullification as self-help and political protest, including the
concerns raised by Kennedy. See Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44
UCLA L. REV. 143, 149 (1996) [hereinafter Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice]. I believe
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posal has two purposes. The most important is self-help - preventing
the punishment (especially incarceration) of African-Americans unless
a utilitarian justification, such as public safety, exists. The second pur-
pose is political - protesting selective law enforcement in the black
community.65 Selective nullification makes the point that, as far as law
enforcement is concerned, what is good enough for white people is
good enough for African-Americans. 66
Kennedy's apprehension of how whites would react to widespread
black jury nullification leads him to urge blacks to choose tactics that,
unlike nullification, do not offend the white majority. He has practical
concerns: "Already, though, the perception that nullification sentiment
is increasing has prompted calls for reaction. An example is the effort
to replace the requirement that juries be unanimous in order to convict
with a less demanding standard under which convictions could be ob-
tained with several jurors voting for acquittal" (p. 302). He points to
the O.J. Simpson case as an example of this phenomenon.
The Simpson case is indeed instructive, but not for the reason
Kennedy thinks it is. Months before the Simpson verdict, the fear of a
hung jury had sparked calls for nonunanimous verdicts in criminal
cases;67 doubtless, some of these calls were based on the fear of racially
based jury nullification by the black majority. The problem is that the
jury verdict - not guilty - was unanimous, and according to the ju-
rors, it was not nullification.68 The jurors simply followed their oath to
that the racial critics' pessimism is warranted by the facts. Since the mid-197os, serious violent
crime in the United States has decreased. See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 2o, at 3. The
share of violent crime attributable to African-Americans has remained constant, at approximately
45%. See id. at 99-ioo. But the incarceration of black people has exploded. See id. at io3. I do
not doubt that at some point American criminal justice will avert its mad enthusiasm for the
punishment of blacks - if only because imprisoning so many will prove too expensive - but I do
not know if black people can afford to wait that long. Considering the law's historically glacial
evolution in the creation of justice for black people, any right-thinking person ought to be wary.
65 See supra note 57 (describing incarceration rates for African-Americans).
66 See Butler, supra note 59, at 866 & n.94; Butier, The Evil of American Criminal Justice, su-
pra note 64, at 148-52.
67 See, e.g., For Sake of Fairness, Stick with Unanimous Verdicts, USA TODAY, June 12, 1995, at
xoA. This editorial, published four months prior to the Simpson verdict, views such calls wryly:
Tonight, the family of Nicole Brown Simpson hopes the nation will remember the first anni-
versary of Nicole's and Ron Goldman's murders with a candlelight vigil for all victims of
violence. Some California lawmakers, though, plan a less laudatory commemoration of the
slayings. Prodded by some prosecutors, they aim to make the state the third to allow less-
than-unanimous verdicts in jury trials of non-death penalty cases.
Id.
68 See, e.g., Edward J. Boyer & Elaine Woo, Case Had Many Holes, Juror Says, L.A. TmEs,
Oct. 4, 1995, at Ai ("It was garbage in, garbage out .... There was a problem with what was
being given to [prosecutors] for testing from LAPD. We felt there were a lot of opportunities for
either contamination of evidence, samples being mixed or stored together." (alteration in original)
(quoting juror Lionel Cryer) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bob Pool & Amy Pyle, Case Was
Weak, Race Not Factor, Two Jurors Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at Ai ("Mr. Simpson was not
guilty. It was not proven. I didn't have enough evidence to convince me." (quoting juror Brenda
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acquit unless they were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
Simpson was guilty. Nonetheless, many whites responded to the verdict
with great hostility. In other words, it was not subversion of the law
that sparked white backlash in the Simpson case - it was faithfulness
to the law. To the extent that the politics of respectability reifies the
respect of white people, it called for the jurors to convict Simpson
without regard for the evidence. The African-American prosecutor in
the Simpson case apparently is another advocate of these politics. He
suggested that the jurors, in acquitting Simpson, should have consid-
ered the possibility that white hostility to the verdict would threaten
affirmative action.6 9
The Simpson case demonstrates that white backlash is not as ra-
tional, and therefore not as amenable to black manipulation, as Ken-
nedy seems to think. Although a nonunanimity requirement would
not have prevented Simpson's acquittal, even after the unanimous
verdict, the backlash - including the calls for nonunanimous verdicts
- has persisted.70
The point is that some white hostility to African-Americans' exer-
cise of civil and political power exists, regardless of how they exercise
that power. There is no reason, then, for African-Americans to tiptoe
around the sensibilities of whites.71
Kennedy's analysis makes it seem as though the unanimity re-
quirement is a special right that African-Americans have and one that
they will lose if they do not act properly. It is safe to say that unani-
mous juries are required in most states not because they are helpful to
blacks, but rather because they are in the interest of the dominant
group - whites. As long as this remains the case, unanimous verdicts
Moran) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. ("[There] wasn't enough evidence or proof."
(quoting juror Gloria Rhodes Rossborough) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69 See Darden Criticizes System, 03". Jury, REUTERS, Mar. r4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, U.S. File (V'I think that by making this case into a race case and that because of the injustice
most people perceive as a result of the verdict, I think they're going to lose affirmative action,' said
Darden, the only black member of the prosecution team."). Kennedy quotes, with apparent ap-
proval, this warning from an anonymous white letter-writer before the Simpson verdict: "When
OJ. gets off the whites will riot the way we whites do: leave the cities, go to Idaho or Oregon or
Arizona, vote for Gingrich ... and punish the blacks by closing their day-care centers and cutting
off their Medicaid" (p. 302).
70 See, e.g., The O.J. Simpson Case: A Legal Aberration, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1995, at Ai8 ('The
Simpson trial and verdict has given rise to a host of quick-fix proposals to reform the courts, includ-
ing one particularly misguided notion to replace unanimous jury verdicts with io-to-2 decisions.').
71 Kennedy warns that black juror nullification would be fodder for prosecutors to exclude
blacks from their juries (pp. 302-03); however, many prosecutors already seek such exclusion, not
because of concern about black nullification, but rather because of concern about black reason-
able doubt, which is of course the legal standard required for conviction. See, e.g., Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, io3 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing several jurisdictions in which
prosecutors peremptorily challenge most black jurors).
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will be required. When it is no longer the case, such verdicts will not
be required, regardless of what African-Americans want.7 2
The politics of respectability fails because it is blind to this central
point: if African-Americans adapted their political and self-help strate-
gies in order to avert white backlash, they would scarcely achieve any
progress at all. No one has argued this point more persuasively than
Randall the Race Man. Discussing criticism of affirmative action, he
made the following observation:
The most weighty claim is that preferential treatment exacerbates racial
resentments, entrenches racial divisiveness, and thereby undermines the
consensus necessary for effective reform. The problem with this view is
that intense white resentment has accompanied every effort to undo racial
subordination no matter how careful the attempt to anticipate and mollify
the reaction. 73
Because racially based jury nullification is necessary self-help for Afri-
can-Americans, I share the Race Man's resignation to white anger:
"Given the apparent inevitability of white resistance and the uncertain
efficacy of containment, proponents of racial justice should be wary of
allowing fear of white backlash to limit the range of reforms pur-
sued."7 4
Principle II illustrates the poverty of imagination inherent in the poli-
tics of responsibility. The politics limits even the aspirations of minori-
ties. Why should African-American ideals of justice be constrained by
what the white market will bear? To paraphrase the feminist maxim,
blacks who seek to be equal to whites lack ambition. The Race Man
was not nearly so compliant when he urged consideration of the tactic of
subversion of law to correct racial injustice. His invitation was not to
black jurors, but "most radically" to Supreme Court Justices. 75 Kennedy
boldly claimed that the threat of "complete dissolution of the legal order"
is one that "should never be absent from the spectrum of possibilities we
implicitly use in evaluating ... political morality," for "[tlhere are re-
gimes that do not warrant continued existence."76
The Race Man's courage - his speaking truth to power - encour-
aged me, his former student, to advocate jury nullification. Though not
so radical as urging judges to "explicitly def[y] existing law,"77 racially
based jury nullification, I hope, will "dismantle the master's house with
72 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518, 524-27 (ig8o) (arguing that Brown was in part a product of an "in-
terest-convergence" between whites and blacks, a convergence the gradual disappearance of
which helps explain waning judicial enthusiasm for enforcing school desegregation).
73 Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1330. Indeed, the most vicious white backlash in recent history
has occurred not in response to the Simpson case, but rather in response to African-American
children seeking to attend integrated schools.
74 Id.
7S Kennedy, supra note ii, at 1655-56.
76 Id. at 1656.
77 Id. at 1655.
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the master's tools." 78 The master's house, a place where he punishes
"bad" blacks and ignores equally bad whites, does "not warrant contin-
ued existence. '79
Im. SCHOLARSHIP AND POWER: RESPECTABLE RANDALL'S
DERELICTION OF DUTY
This Review begins with one description of criminal justice in the na-
tion's capital. I conclude it with another description. I live in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in a middle-class, racially integrated neighborhood.
Recently, as I walked near my home, I was stopped by the police and
questioned about where I lived. After protesting the interrogation -
one does not have to reside in a place to walk on public streets - I re-
luctantly showed the police my home. My word, alas, was not good
enough; the police requested proof that I lived there. I refused to display
such proof. The police - five officers - refused to leave me until I did.
The encounter lasted approximately one hour. It ended when one officer
interviewed my neighbor, who confirmed my residence.80
The police claimed that they stopped me because they do not often
see people walking in my neighborhood. I believe that I was stopped
because I am black. I have no way of proving this; the officers also are
African-American, a fact that perhaps weakens the racialist explanation.
If, however, I am right - if my blackness was the reason the officers
found me suspicious - the police acted lawfully. Most courts allow the
police to use race-dependent assessments of suspicion. Recently, the
most vehement racial critic of this law has been Respectable Randall.
For him, it is the most significant racial discrimination in criminal justice
(P. 387).
Here my difference with Kennedy is one of degree, not kind. I am
gratified by Kennedy's embrace of one of the racial critiques but disap-
pointed by his failure to understand its relationship to other concerns of
larger consequence. Kennedy believes that, when police use race as a
proxy for suspicion, they offend the Equal Protection Clause, which re-
quires color-blindness (pp. 146-5o). "This racially disparate treatment is
wrong" (p. 387), Respectable Randall opines, and should be changed for
two reasons. First, eliminating it would lessen police harassment of
blacks, and second, the present practice "nourishes powerful feelings of
racial grievance against law enforcement.., that are prevalent in every
strata of black communities," including "elite blacks" (p. 151). As it
stands, the law "generates large pools of distrust, anger, and discord" (p.
387).
78 Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification, supra note 64, at 68o.
79 Kennedy, supra note iI, at 1656.
80 The incident occurred, ironically, one evening after I worked late on this Book Review. For a
more complete description, see Paul Butler, "Walking While Black": Encounters with the Police on
My Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. so, 1997, at 23.
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Race-based suspicion also generates large pools of black criminals.
People tend to find the things for which they look. If the police concen-
trated their enforcement of the drug laws at Harvard Law School (on
the theory, say, that law enforcement is a public good and that those stu-
dents should enjoy much of it), the percentage of Harvard law students
under criminal justice supervision would rise appreciably. Special en-
forcement of these same laws among African-Americans accounts for a
large number of those blacks whom Kennedy, and the law, call "bad."8' 1
This - the most substantial injury of race-based suspicion - es-
capes the notice of Respectable Randall, as I suppose it must, for this
fact exposes the fallacy of his politics. It turns out that respectability, in-
sofar as it requires that one not be a criminal, is a raced concept. It at-
taches to whites, because they are white, and eludes African-Americans,
because they are black. Particularly for drug offenses, whites are not re-
spectable on the ground that they obey the law. African-Americans obey
the law just as much, or just as little. Whites are respectable because
they do not get caught Blacks are bad because they get caught more
often. In the case of race-based suspicion, which gives the police legal
authority to stop and question, the law explicitly aids the maintenance of
white supremacist criminal justice. It would be naive to think that the
criminal justice system's relationship to white supremacy began and
ended with law authorizing the police to.make stops based on race.
Kennedy's tunnel vision is particularly vexing because of his status
as the nation's preeminent African-American legal scholar. There is an
underwhelming number of black authors whose writing is first on law
professors' reading lists. The Race Man noted that the "inescapable
linkage of scholarship and power is especially important when the sub-
ject is race relations law," because "whether intended or not, every work
... educates our moral and political intuitions." 2
Publication, then, of Randall Kennedy's Race, Crime, and the Law
represented an important opportunity for all African-Americans, in-
cluding the approximately half of all young black men in Washington,
D.C., who are in prison or under criminal supervision. Yet publication
revealed that Kennedy's main concern with these young men is that he
not be confused with them - not by the police and not by white people.
Kennedy's book responds to white supremacy by hoping that some
blacks can achieve the status of honorary whites. If the strategy were
successful on its own terms - if it eliminated the "black elite" victims of
white supremacy - it would still be irresponsible, because it would not
address the most severe consequence of white supremacy in criminal jus-
tice: the gross and disparate punishment of African-Americans. Because
81 See Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MCH. L.
REV. 166o, 1675-77 (1996) (describing the relationship between discriminatory law enforcement prac-
tices and disproportionate arrest and incarceration of African-Americans).
82 Kennedy, supra note ix, at 163o-31.
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the strategy probably will not succeed - even on its own, unambitious
terms - it is tragic.
We need not speculate what the Race Man would say about Respect-
able Randall, his lost brother. We are blessed by the Race Man's words
to another esteemed law professor who did not see white supremacy
when it all but knocked him over. In 1986, Professor Kennedy advised
that scholarship that "adequately assimilates the feelings and interests of
black victims will require the cultivation of new sources of information,
the revision of established views, and perhaps most daunting, an empa-
thetic imagination of the suffering inflicted by racial offense."83
This is the project for which Kennedy's community requires his help.
We understand his present frustration, for the Race Man counseled that
"creating and preserving a memory of suffering ... is especially crucial
but particularly vulnerable ... to moral fatigue, to the blandishments of
'victor's' history, to specious arguments that defuse outrage by reference
to the ubiquity of human injustice."8 4 The Race Man's last words, how-
ever, embolden us, the way counsel toward freedom always does:
"[w]hatever the difficulties, few things pose more of a moral and intellec-
tual imperative." 85




RACES, CRIME, AND THE LAW
Viet D. Dinh*
Randall Kennedy has written an impressive book, one worthy of a
scholar "doing the smartest work in the area of race."' But because
"the racial conflict upon which it mainly focuses is the white-black
confrontation" (p. xii), the book misses a golden opportunity to expand
the conversation about race to its proper contemporary sphere. Al-
though Kennedy acknowledges the existence of other racial fault lines
in American society, he adopts a bichromatic focus on race relations
because "it is the racial frontier separating whites from blacks where
the difficulties have proven hardest to overcome" (p. xii).
Kennedy's reason for limiting his thorough work to black-white
relations is largely historical:
This is the conflict that has served as the great object lesson for American
law, the conflict that has given birth to much of the federal constitutional
law of criminal procedure, and the conflict that remains the most perva-
sive and volatile point of racial friction within federal and state court-
houses (p. xii).
The historical dominance of the bichromatic vision of race relations is
incontrovertible. 2  The shameful specter of slavery still haunts many
conversations about race,3 and the civil rights movement centered on
black struggles against white oppression.
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Harvard College,
iggo; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. Many thanks to Charles F. Abernathy, Lan Cao, David D.
Cole, Neal Katyal, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments, and to Jennifer Anglim, Emily A.
Johnson, and Beatriz Sarmiento for their research assistance.
1 Chris Klein, Summertime Snooze: A Peek at Professors' (Serious) Reading Lists, NAT'L L.,
June 9, 1997, at A14 (quoting Paul Brest) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Kennedy is not alone in focusing on the black-white conflict; almost every major book on
race in recent years has done so. See, e.g., JONATHAN COLEMAN, LONG WAY To Go: BLACK
AND WHITE IN AMERICA (1997); DAvI K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLACKS AND
WHITES IN AMERICA (1997); STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997). Some notable attempts to expand the
conversation include Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IowA L. REV. 145 (1994); Viet D. Dinh, Multiracial
Affirmative Action, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE
POLITICS OF INCLUSION 280-89 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REv. 367 (1996);
Alexandra Natapoff, Madisonian Multiculturalism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 751 (1995); Symposium,
Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (iggS); and Eric K. Yama-
moto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights
America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (I997). The second of these attempts is admittedly notable only to
its author. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, This Article Is BrilliantlThis Article Is Stupid:
Positive and Negative Self-Reference in Constitutional Practice and Theory (Dec. 1, 1997) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
3 For example, when Justice Stevens dissented from the Supreme Court's validation of a
hiring practice that had a disparate impact on minority workers in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
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To say that the black-white conflict has dominated the history of
race relations, however, does not mean that it is the only dynamic that
matters. Other racial divisions have shaped the current racial cli-
mate.4 Our present society is multiracial, and it will likely be increas-
ingly so in the future.5 To acknowledge the importance of a past of
racial discrimination, conflict, and progress, as I do, is not to contend
that present conditions and concern for the future should be neglected
in formulating race policy. Kennedy limits his analysis to the historical
past, but his policy prescriptions operate prospectively in the future,
which admits of no such limitations. Conversations about race, while
recognizing the history of biracial conflict and dialogue, should also
acknowledge the multiracial reality of today and tomorrow.
This Review expands Kennedy's work beyond the black-white
paradigm and evaluates his analysis in a multiracial context. Part I
examines the historical assumption that ours was a biracial society and
explores the complications created when persons who were neither
black nor white tried to ally themselves with the dominant white class.
Part II defends, based on the recognition that ours is a multiracial so-
ciety, the principle of racial neutrality that underlies much of Ken-
nedy's policy prescriptions. Part I explores how a multiracial focus
informs the meaning of "reasonableness" in criminal law and proce-
dure. In the end, this Review is much less a critique than an affirma-
tion of Kennedy's central theses. But it affirms for different (or at
least additional) reasons and analyzes without restriction, with the
hope that Kennedy's core contributions will be recognized in the
broader context of our multiracial society.
I. THE BIRACIAL SIMPLIFICATION
Kennedy aptly begins his history of race and crime by observing
that, in order to maintain slavery, the legal system licensed white slave
owners to subjugate their black slaves, even when the mechanisms of
control included murder, battery, and rape (pp. 30-36). Of course,
even in this early period, things were not so clearly black and white;
Native Americans also occupied the land. Conveniently, the justifica-
tions for dominating the conquered natives paralleled those needed to
validate slavery. In Johnson v. McIntosh,6 the first Native American
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (x989), he summoned the image of a "plantation economy" of slaves, id. at
664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting), even though the affected nonwhite workers were of Samoan, Chi-
nese, Filipino, Japanese, and Alaska Native descent, see id. at 663 n.4.
4 Kennedy recognizes this fact (p. xii) and discusses some incidents and cases that did not in-
volve blacks (e.g., pp. 37 n.*, 138-40,355). Except for one instance (pp. 244-45), however, he does
not relax his bichromatic assumption or explore the implications of his observations in a multira-
cial context.
S See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more, 47 STAN. L. Rnv. 957, 960-62 (1995).
6 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
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land claims case, Chief Justice John Marshall stated plainly that "title
by conquest is acquired and maintained by force."7 According to
Chief Justice Marshall, the bellicose nature of the natives rendered the
general norms governing the conqueror and conquered "incapable of
application," and new laws had to be developed to protect the white
inhabitants, however these laws might have been "opposed to natural
right, and to the usages of civilized nations.",, The white colonists' at-
titudes toward Native Americans thus converged with their policies
toward African slaves, and some laws of racial exclusion expressly
grouped Indians in the same class as blacks.9
The peopling of America with other nonwhites complicated the
mechanics of racial exclusion, and the law adapted by adopting the bi-
racial simplification. Efforts by nonblack minorities to be on the win-
ning side of the black-white divide, either to escape the burdens of
being black or to reap the benefits of being white, were generally un-
successful.' 0 Even in the few circumstances in which blacks were ac-
corded a legal benefit, such advantages did not extend to nonblack
minorities. For example, in Ozawa v. United States," a Japanese man
living in the United States sought citizenship under a statute that
granted naturalization rights to "aliens, being free white persons, and
to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.' 2 The
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that he was a "free
white person, 1 3 holding that "the words 'white person' are synony-
mous with the words 'a person of the Caucasian race.""u4 Less than
two months later, Bhagat Singh Thind, a "high caste Hindu, of full In-
dian blood,"' s argued that, because he was a Caucasian, he was enti-
tled to naturalization under the same statute at issue in Ozawa.16 The
Court also rejected Thind's argument, holding that the phrase "free
white person" is "synonymous with the word 'Caucasian' only as that
word is popularly understood," an understanding that did not include
7 Id. at 589.
8 Id. at 591; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) i, 18 (1831) ("[T]he idea of
appealing to an American court of justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had per-
haps never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk
9 See, e.g., infra p. 1292. Indeed, prior to the Civil War, Native Americans and blacks were
generally grouped together in both common parlance and census classifications as "colored." See
JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES 263 (2d ed., Univ. of Ill. Press 1993) (i988).
10 See infra pp. 1292-93.
11 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
12 Id. at i9o.
13 Id. at i9g. Counsel argued: "The Japanese are 'free.' They, or at least the dominant
strains, are 'white persons,' speaking an Aryan tongue and having Caucasian root stocks; a supe-
rior class, fit for citizenship." Id. at 185.
14 Id. at 198.
Is United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 204 (1923).
16 See id. at 2o-o6.
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East Indians. 17 These and other consistent rejections suggest that the
law's historical underprotection of blacks, so amply recounted by Ken-
nedy, also resonates for other racial minorities.
But something else was also going on. Nonblack minorities, in
seeking to exploit the black-white paradigm to their advantage, often
distinguished themselves from and at times expressly denigrated
blacks. Nascent racial fault lines emerged when the biracial assump-
tion confronted a multiracial reality. Consider People v. Hall.18  In
1853, based on the testimony of one Caucasian and three Chinese wit-
nesses, a jury convicted George Hall of murder and sentenced him to
death.19 Hall argued to the California Supreme Court that the testi-
mony of the Chinese witnesses was barred by the following statutory
provision: 20 "No black or mulatto person, or Indian, shall be permitted
to give evidence in favor of, or against, any white person." 21 The court
agreed and invalidated Hall's conviction.22 First, the court held that
the Chinese were included in the category of "Indian. '23 But even if
the definition of "Indian" did not encompass Chinese persons, the
meaning of black "must, by every sound rule of construction, exclude
every one who [was] not of white blood."24 The reason for banning the
testimony of blacks and Indians (that a white person should not be
condemned by the words of an inferior) applied equally to Asians, who
were simply "the more degraded tribes of the same species" of colored
people. 25
The vehement Chinese response to Hall signaled the complications
of grafting a biracial simplification onto a multiracial reality. An open
letter from a Chinese merchant to the governor of California was no-
17 Id. at 214-15.
18 4 Cal. 399 (1854). Kennedy briefly discusses this case in the context of Civil War-era stat-
utes prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites (p. 37 n.*).
19 See Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century
America: The First Phase, x850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REv. 529, 548-50 (1984). For a complete history
of the case, see CHARLES J. McCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 20-24 (1994).
20 See Hall, 4 Cal. at 399.
21 Act of Apr. 16, 185o, ch. 99, § 14, i85o Cal. Stat. 229, 230, amended by Act of Mar. z8, 1863,
ch. 70, 1863 Cal. Stat. 69, repealed by omission from codification CAL. PENAL CODE § 1321 (2872)
(officially repealed by Act of Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 48, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 488, 489).
22 See Hall, 4 Cal. at 404-05.
23 See id. at 402. Chief Justice Murray recalled that, when Christopher Columbus landed, he
mistakenly thought that he had reached Asia, and had dubbed the native inhabitants "Indian."
See id. at 400. He assumed that, when the legislature enacted the law, it was disposed to this
meaning of the word, which included all peoples of Asia. See id. He further noted that, because
"[a]lmost every tribe has some tradition of coming from the North," it was reasonable for the leg-
islators to assume that the ancestors of Native Americans were Asiatics who crossed Behring's
Straits. Id. at 401. Chinese witnesses, therefore, should be included in the statute's prohibition
against Indian testimony. See id. at 402.




table not only for its anger, but also for its own racial stratification
theory:
[O]f late days, your honorable people have established a new practice.
They have come to the conclusion that we Chinese are the same as Indi-
ans and Negroes, and your courts will not allow us to bear witness. And
yet these Indians know nothing about the relations of society; they know
no mutual respect; they wear neither clothes nor shoes; they live in wild
places and [in] caves.26
This argument was echoed by the plaintiff in Gong Lum v. Rice.
2 7
Gong Lum, a Mississippi resident of Chinese descent, sued the local
school district to obtain permission for his American-born daughter to
attend the white school instead of the colored one.2 8 Lum's argument
was simple: ."'Colored' describes only one race, and that is the ne-
gro."29 Mississippi's system of segregation protected the white race
from the danger of mixing with blacks. According to Lum, then, equal
protection required that "[t]he white race ... not legally expose the
yellow race to a danger that the dominant race recognize[d] and, by
the same laws, guard[ed] itself against."30 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that the creation and definition of segregated school
systems were within the power of the state legislature, without consti-
tutional implications.
3 1
The history of these cases complicates the biracial paradigm and
suggests that other, more subtle fault lines divided the various racial
minorities. The common strand running through these cases is a nas-
cent conflict among members of the minority races; each was at-
tempting to align itself with the winning side, to be counted as white
by distinguishing itself from other minorities and at times even explic-
itly denigrating them. The intuition behind this strategy is easy to un-
derstand: when the law takes account of race and many races exist,
each race will attempt to use the racial classifications to its advantage.
The next Part generalizes this intuition into a defense of racial neu-
trality in a multiracial society.
26 LAI CHUN-CHUEN, REMARKS OF THE CHINESE MERCHANTS OF SAN FRANCISCO UPON
GOVERNOR BIGLER'S MESSAGE 5 (W. Speer trans., I855), quoted in McClain, supra note ig, at
550 (alterations in McClain).
27 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
28 See id. at 78.
29 Id. at 79.
30 Id. In the first California Supreme Court case to test the exclusion of Chinese testimony
under the Fourteenth Amendment, a partially black person successfully argued that he would be
denied equal protection if Chinese witnesses were permitted at his trial but not at the trial of
white defendants. See People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 666-67 (i869).




Infusing Kennedy's careful analysis of criminal law and procedure
is a deep respect for a vision of racial neutrality that his parting words
make explicit: "the uncompromisable ideal of treating all persons
equally regardless of race, an aspiration best sought by responding to
persons strictly on the basis of conduct not color" (p. 39o). Embracing
the attitude that "all persons and all groups [should] be accorded
equality before the law with no privileged or subordinated castes" (p.
136), Kennedy devotes much of his analysis to overcoming this vision's
historical antagonist - "an insistence that, at bottom, the United
States of America is, and should remain, a white man's country" (p.
136).
However, his vision of racial neutrality faces a challenge not only
from those who seek to assert white supremacy, but also from those
who advocate color consciousness to ensure adequate racial represen-
tation. Kennedy's historical analysis justifies racial neutrality as a de-
fense against white supremacy but does not answer the challenge
posed by the new color consciousness. At various points, Kennedy
does look beyond history and defend racial neutrality as a prophylactic
against the dangers of discrimination (p. 151) and of "producing or re-
inforcing resentments, feelings of superiority and inferiority, and incen-
tives favoring sentiments of racial kinship and solidarity" (pp. 231-32).
This Part bolsters Kennedy's analysis and offers an additional defense
of racial neutrality against the alternative of racial pluralism, a defense
predicated upon the recognition that ours is a multiracial society.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, guarantees an individual the right to
be free from governmental discrimination on the basis of race, except
when racial classifications are narrowly tailored to further a compel-
ling governmental interest.32 The Court has offered little guidance re-
garding which governmental interests are sufficiently compelling to
justify abrogation of the equal protection norm.33 However, if we take
seriously the premise that racial equal protection is an individual
32 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-30, 237 (x995).
33 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 932-37 (1988). See generally Confer-
ence on Compelling Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB. L.




right,34 then at the very least, governmental action cannot, without
further justification, burden one racial group. The question thus be-
comes what justification is sufficient to validate racially discriminatory
governmental action.
Here the analysis shifts from the nature of the right - group ver-
sus individual - to the strength of the right. Although the right to ra-
cial equal protection is not absolute (otherwise a compelling interest
analysis would be unnecessary), it is at least of some constitutional
stature. Arguments about the necessity and wisdom of some govern-
mental policy, however strong they may be, are not enough to abrogate
a constitutional right. The justification for such abrogation must de-
rive from a governmental policy that seeks to affirm or advance other
important constitutional rights and values.35
The classic example of such a justification is one that seeks to rem-
edy past violations of other individuals' right to equal protection. In
evaluating this kind of action, we need not even assess the relative
stature of the rights at issue; they are the same right. Because the
norm of equal protection has been abrogated in the past, any but the
most formalistic conception of equality would justify a deviation from
the norm of equal treatment to restore the victims to their rightful po-
sition.
But here we encounter the problem of victim specificity. Group
remedies could be thought to contradict the premise that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees individual protection against group-
based distinctions.36 This is a powerful, but ultimately unavailing, ar-
gument. The remedial goal is to place the individual in the position
she would have occupied absent the constitutional violation - that is,
absent the unjustified group classification. Because the wrong was
group-based, the remedy must reverse the group classification and
work backwards toward the point of individual parity. Moreover, the
group burdened by the proposed racial classification must be the same
group that benefited from the earlier equal protection violation.
In a biracial society, defining the relevant groups is simply a matter
of drawing lines at different levels of generality. At one extreme, all
past actions of the dominant group could be understood to violate the
norm of equal protection, and thus all governmental actions seeking to
benefit the minority group could be viewed as remedial ones.37 At the
34 See generally Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, r989 Term-Comment: Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HAPv. L. REv. 107, 107-12 (iggo) (discussing the
merits of equal protection as an individual, as opposed to group, right).
3S See, e.g., Kate Stith, Government Interests in Criminal Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 679, 680-83
(1992).
36 See, e.g., Adarand, 5i5 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Missouri v. Jenkins, 5 I5 U.S. 70, 137 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
37 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369 (1978) (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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other extreme, one could insist on particularized showings of individ-
ual violations and direct harms.38 In the middle is the entire range of
governmental actions, and the Court's jurisprudence on the procedural
aspects of strict scrutiny attempts to draw the line at the appropriate
level of generality.39
In a multiracial society, however, the use of racial criteria suffers
from jurisprudential and practical infirmities that may be insurmount-
able. First, the allocation of relative fault and compensatory desert
among the various racial groups may be impossibly complicated. Sec-
ond, imprecisions in the identification and definition of racial groups
raise a host of hard questions that may take away any practical value
of racial classifications. Finally, the use of racial criteria engenders re-
sentment and conflict among minority racial groups that may exacer-
bate rather than salve the wounds of racial injustice in our society. I
discuss each point in turn.
Relaxing the assumption that only two relevant groups exist com-
plicates the justifications for racial classifications. The existence of
nonblack victims of past discrimination requires some differentiation
of the relative scope and extent of each racial group's claim to com-
pensatory justice. Even if such calibration is possible, we must assess
the culpability of the groups that the proposed racial classification dis-
advantages. In a multiracial society with limited resources for gov-
ernment assistance, law enforcement, and legislative action - in short,
for protection of the law - classifications that benefit one group nec-
essarily burden the others. Proponents of such racial classifications
must justify to the people who are burdened why their individual
rights to equal protection are being abrogated. This justification re-
quires both vertical line-drawing as to the level of generality of fault
and harm and a horizontal calculation of relative fault and compensa-
tory entitlements among various racial groups.
Any group classification also raises problems of indeterminacy with
respect to the definition and composition of the group. The problem
exists even in a biracial society, because the ethnic and cultural diver-
sity within each race highlights the artificiality of racial groupings.
The problem becomes intractable, however, in a society in which there
exists a multitude of different racial groups, each with its own ethnic
and cultural subgroups. Kennedy highlights this indeterminacy in his
discussion of the racial composition of juries, an instance in which he
departs from the biracial paradigm:
38 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
39 See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 5oo (requiring a "strong basis in evidence" of a viola-
tion (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (demanding a "firm basis for believing that remedial action is required').
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In an increasingly multiracial society, controversies over racial classifica-
tions will become even more complex, frequent, and vexing. What does
the judge do about the person who is part Asian and part black? Is such
a defendant entitled to a minimum quota of Asian-Americans or a mini-
mum quota of African-Americans? Is an Afro-Asian juror racially similar
to a "plain" African-American? Is a Latino who traces his heritage back
to Mexico "racially similar" to a Latino who traces his heritage back to
Puerto Rico? Is a person who traces his heritage back to China "racially
similar" to an individual who traces his heritage back to Vietnam (p. 244)?
The appeal of group criteria is that they are easier and less costly to
administer than individualized determinations. In a multiracial soci-
ety, however, the multiplicity and complexity of racial identifications
raise serious questions as to the continuing viability of this rationale.
Finally, the use of racial criteria in a multiracial society has the po-
tential to ignite and fuel tension and conflict among various racial
groups. 40 Such tension arises in part from the complications outlined
above: the difficulty of providing sufficient justification for deviations
from the norm of equal protection and the practical problems of de-
fining relevant racial groupings. More fundamentally, tension results
simply from the competition among racial groups for benefits con-
ferred by color-conscious governmental policies. To highlight the exis-
tence of interethnic conflict is not, of course, to deny that white dis-
crimination remains the major problem in race relations or that there
is great potential for racial harmony.41 Whatever the latent causes of
racial prejudice in our multiracial society, the task is to minimize the
effects of such racist attitudes in order to prevent them from igniting
racial conflict. Those effects are exacerbated, not minimized, when ra-
cial competition is encouraged by state action without adequate justifi-
cation and with ill-defined parameters.
In the end, I think the governmental use of racial criteria in a mul-
tiracial society poses questions that are intractable and obstacles that
are insurmountable. The most practical solution to the multiracial di-
lemma is simply to refrain from using race as a basis for state action.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged the multiracial
complexities of our society and has endorsed a principle of racial neu-
trality in an attempt to ward off the danger of interethnic conflict.42
Racial neutrality, of course, is not the only answer, but I think that it is
the best of the available alternatives.
40 See Ramirez, supra note 5, at 969-74; J. Harvie Wilkinson I1, The Law of Civil Rights and
the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1oi6-18 (i995); Alex-
andra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority
Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1o59, 1o63 (1995).
41 See Charles R Lawrence IT, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of
ransformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 8ig, 829-35 (i995).
42 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-29, 235-36 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 63o, 647-49, 657 (1993). By racial neutrality, I mean that race is not used except as a
narrowly tailored means to advance a compelling government interest. See supra pp. 1294-96.
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One alternative to racial neutrality is to take full account of race to
achieve racial justice. Eric Yamamoto criticizes the Supreme Court's
antidiscrimination jurisprudence precisely because it does not "interro-
gate racial identities or the history of racial subordination." 43 For Ya-
mamoto, the Court's emphasis on multiracial conflict, combined with
its insistence on racial neutrality, points to an inherent contradiction
borne of complacency: "Implicit in this contradictory recognition-
nonrecognition of interracial dynamics is the decision not to develop a
meaningful interracial jurisprudence. '44  This criticism, however,
misses the point. Racial neutrality is an interracial jurisprudence.
One solution to racial conflict is perhaps the most obvious: stop taking
race into account. The contradiction in this position arises only if one
insists on the proposition, itself fraught with internal tension, that one
can only solve racial problems by resorting to racial classifications. 4
Yamamoto proposes the antithesis to racial neutrality in the law, "a
view of courts as sites of, and participants in, 'cultural performances'
concerning outsider challenges to existing social and legal arrange-
ments." 46 According to Yamamoto, the players in these cultural per-
formances should adopt a critical race praxis, which "combines critical
pragmatic socio-legal analysis with political lawyering and community
organizing for justice practice[d] by and for racialized communities. '47
These are worthy goals indeed, but they do not address the fundamen-
tal problems posed by race consciousness in a multiracial society. The
analysis necessary to justify the use of race, as outlined above, involves
indeterminate and perhaps indeterminable allocations of rights and re-
sponsibilities along multiple axes. What Yamamoto terms "more or
less an ordinary investigation of a legal claim"48 is in fact quite an ex-
traordinary jurisprudential, historical, and sociological undertaking.
And the call to action on behalf of the racialized communities ignores
the possibility that such action may be directed at or operate against
other racial groups, thereby exacerbating rather than alleviating the
problem. The institutionalization of race in the legal structure prom-
ises to engender a perpetual conflict, with little hope for moving be-
yond race to the ideal of equality and accommodation.
43 Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 861.
44 Id.
45 To be sure, the Court is susceptible to the criticism that its application of the principle of
racial neutrality is inconsistent. As Kennedy points out, the Court has insisted on racial neutrality
in affirmative action and voting rights cases but still permits police stops and searches based on
racial criteria (p. 16o). I think this criticism is well-founded, and as I discuss in Part III, racial
neutrality must be consistently applied across the board.
46 Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 871 (citing Eric K. Yamamoto, Moses Haia & Donna Kalama,
Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law
Rights to Sue, I6 U. HAW. L. REV. I (1994)).
47 Id. at 875.
48 Id. at 878.
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Among the most interesting and candid answers to the multiracial
dilemma is that of "Madisonian multiculturalism." 49 Heeding the ad-
monition of The Federalist No. 1o that "[tihe latent causes of faction
are ... sown in the nature of man,"50 Alexandra Natapoff argues that
it is futile to ignore race, "one of the great causes of faction in Ameri-
can history."5' Instead, she contends, the race debate should be recog-
nized as an exercise in interest group politics; so viewed, the task of
governance is not to eliminate racial competition but to minimize its
effects.5 2 The dangers of factional competition are realized only when
a faction constitutes a majority, because "concerted political action by
the majority is more fearsome than that of minority groups which, by
virtue of the structure of the political system itself, can wreak only
limited havoc on the rights of others." 3 This recognition counsels in
favor of letting racial competition flourish among minority groups and,
at the same time, justifies differential treatment of the white major-
ity 4
This approach has much superficial appeal but, in the end, is fun-
damentally flawed. The insistence on racial neutrality for governmen-
tal actions is not an attempt to root out race as a cause of factions.
Race matters, racial factions exist, and racial interest groups exert in-
fluence in any number of ways and for any number of purposes, in-
cluding to attain electoral and legislative advantage. What equal pro-
tection eschews is the imprimatur of government sanction of racial
distinctions. By the same token, monarchists are free to organize and
advocate their cause, but they cannot, without constitutional amend-
ment, displace our republican governments5 or seek acknowledgment
of nobility status from the government.5 6 Race is indeed one of the
great causes of factions in our history, and it would be futile and fool-
ish to deny the relevance of race in everyday life. Racial interest
groups can form and flourish; equal protection only limits the ability of
these groups to enact into law distinctions based on race.
Underlying the ideal of racial neutrality is precisely a recognition
that race is very relevant in American life and has the potential to di-
vide our community into competing enclaves of racial identities. His-
tory teaches that legal structures can be marshaled into the service of
racial injustice, and the continued use of race in official actions may
lead to a very real danger of such abuse. More fundamentally, the
powerful relevance of race and its tendency toward divisiveness coun-
49 Natapoff, supra note 2, at 751.
50 THE FEDERALiST No. Io, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 196).
1 Natapoff, supra note 2, at 753.
52 See id. at 752-53.
53 Id. at 755.
S4 See id. at 755-56.
SS See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
S6 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § io, cl. i.
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sel caution before granting racial classifications official sanction.
When the use of race can be sufficiently circumscribed and adequately
justified, such use may well be appropriate, indeed required, to ad-
vance the cause of racial justice. However, when, as in a complex
multiracial .ociety, the difficulties inherent in justifying and monitor-
ing the official use of race are all but impossible to overcome, such use
actually threatens the cause of racial justice. Racial neutrality, under
those circumstances, becomes the only durable safeguard against the
institutionalization and perpetuation of racial conflict.
III. NEUTRALITY IN CRIMINAL LAW
This Part explores how racial neutrality should operate in criminal
law and procedure by focusing on one particular application - the
concept of reasonableness. The determination of what is reasonable
calls for generalized judgments of what is typical and proper conduct
in our society and thus necessarily implicates racial considerations.5 7
Kennedy discusses the concept of reasonableness but, without elucida-
tion, dismisses the relevance of race in ascertaining its meaning:
Giving legal recognition to racially differentiated concepts of proper con-
duct - the black reasonable person, the white reasonable person, and so
on - will encourage the creation of racially distinct mores, reactions, be-
liefs, and intuitions. I oppose that project. As I argue throughout this
book, I aim to facilitate the emergence of a polity that is overwhelmingly
indifferent to racial differences, a polity that looks beyond looks (p. 167).
This Part takes up the challenge of considering whether race should
ever be a factor in the meaning of reasonableness. I conclude that the
fact that America is a multiracial society further strengthens Ken-
nedy's argument that it is neither justifiable nor practicable to recog-
nize any racial contingencies to reasonable conduct.
Reasonableness can have two quite separate meanings. The first is
a descriptive notion of typicality, a prediction about what people
would generally do if faced with a particular situation.58 The second
is a normative definition that asks what the decisionmaker would
want people to do under the circumstances.5 9 These two distinct
meanings often are fused together in practice; the hard cases arise
when the normative component of reasonableness conflicts with the
descriptive one. Consider the impact of race on a person's behavior.
S7 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, IO7 HARV. L. REV. 757,
8o8-o 9 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
838-44 (I1994).
58 See Lee, supra note 2, at 495.
59 See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 789-90 (1994); Lee, supra note 2, at 495-98; see
also Anthony J. Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?, 57 U. PITT.
L. REv. 725, 725-35 (1996) (discussing the concept of reasonableness in terms of self-defense).
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Even if it were stipulated that, as a descriptive matter, all persons
would respond similarly to the fact of a person's race in a particular
situation, should the law countenance that response as reasonable?
If it is agreed that persons should not adopt a response based on
race, then I think the answer must be no, the response is not reason-
able; the normative must trump the descriptive. Although the descrip-
tive is but a reflection of private reactions, the imprimatur of the state
is granted when such private biases are given legal effect in a criminal
proceeding. The official nature of the message is evident because the
normative and descriptive components are inextricably intertwined in
the definition of reasonableness; it is simply impossible to bear witness
to the descriptive validity of the racial reaction without also imprinting
it with normative validation. A judgment of reasonableness connotes
both that the reaction is typical and that it is proper.
Thrning now to the content of the normative judgment, should the
law contextualize the concept of reasonableness in racial terms? I do
not think so. First, such contextualization institutionalizes racial divi-
sions in our society. It not only acknowledges that different races exist,
but also assumes that members of each race all think alike and that
each race collectively thinks and acts differently from others. In addi-
tion to being plainly false, these assumptions constitute exactly the ex-
clusionary racial stereotypes that history has taught us to guard
against. Second, the contextualizations would be numerous. In a mul-
tiracial society, there are by definition a number of different races. If
the meaning of reasonableness is contextualized for one race, equality
requires that it be similarly contextualized for all other races. In addi-
tion, because of the inherent advantage of particularizing any objective
determination, a hydraulic pressure pushes racial contextualizations
down to their lowest tenable units. The multiplicity and complexity of
different racial contexts make racially particularized judgments of rea-
sonableness impracticable in a multiracial society.
Quite apart from these intrinsic reasons to question the recognition
of racial contingencies to reasonableness, the judicial process does not
possess the institutional competence to determine what is reasonable
(either descriptively or normatively) within a particular race. Even as-
suming that there exists a unitary concept of reasonableness for each
race, it is not at all clear how that concept can be established or chal-
lenged in a judicial proceeding. Absent similarity of experience or
very deep empathy, judges and jurors must resort to self-fulfilling ra-
cial stereotypes and biases in order to determine what is reasonable
within a particular race.60
60 One solution to this problem is to match the race of the decisionmakers to that of the defen-
dant. Leaving aside the circularity of such an answer, independent reasons exist, as discussed in
Part IT, to object to race matching on its own terms.
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Take, for example, the law of self-defense. 61 In order to prevail, the
defendant must establish, among other things, that he had an honest
and reasonable belief that the victim would inflict imminent bodily
harm.62 What should we make of a defendant who claims that he
feared for his safety because he assumed that the victim, an Asian
male, knew martial arts and therefore was capable of inflicting serious
bodily harm,63 or that the victim, a black male, would likely rob and
assault him when he approached? On the one hand, the defendant's
reaction to the race of the victim(s) should be considered in determin-
ing whether he had an honest subjective belief that he was in danger.64
That he was ignorant, wrong, or even racist does not detract from the
fact that he honestly believed that the victim was going to harm him.
Recognition of this descriptive fact in no way makes the court com-
plicit in the defendant's views. The question whether his belief was
objectively reasonable, however, is a different matter. A decision that
the belief was reasonable must rest on the tenuous determination that
most people would make the same ignorant, wrong, or racist calcula-
tion and would react similarly, and on the objectionable judgment that
such racially motivated reactions are proper in our society. In making
such a judgment, the court would be actively validating the defend-
ant's racism.
Racial neutrality, it should be remembered, works both ways. In
Ha v. State,65 for example, the Vietnamese decedent threatened the de-
fendant, also Vietnamese, during a drunken fight.66  Twelve hours
later, the defendant shot the unwitting decedent. 67  Challenging his
conviction for second-degree murder, Ha argued that he was entitled
to a self-defense jury instruction despite the twelve-hour cool down pe-
riod.68 Ha claimed that he had no reasonable alternatives to killing
the decedent because "Vietnamese culture teaches that all police are
corrupt, that one can expect no help from the authorities, and that
people must take the law into their own hands to resolve personal dis-
putes."69 The court, rightly in my view, rejected Ha's argument.70
First, the jury could not have assessed the accuracy of Ha's cultural
claims. Ha did not offer any "evidence" of such cultural norms beyond
bare assertions by counsel, and one wonders what such evidence
61 For a thorough and insightful discussion of the interaction between race and the doctrine of
self-defense, see Armour, cited above in note 59.
62 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN IV. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7, at
653-57 (i986).
63 See State v. Simon, 646 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Kan. r982).
64 See Lee, supra note 2, at 473.
6S 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. '995).
66 See id. at i86.
67 See id. at 187.
68 See id. at i88-9o.




would consist of and how the factfinder would assess its accuracy.
Lacking an evidentiary basis, Ha's argument is simply an appeal to
the jury's preconceptions or stereotypes (suggested by Ha himself)
about Vietnamese cultural traits. Second, even if Ha's cultural claims
were verifiably true, they should not be countenanced normatively and
given legal effect. To validate Ha's conduct as reasonable behavior
would carve a racial exception to the law, and Ha offered no reason
why that would be a desirable or even tenable result.
The law of search and seizure presents another application of the
reasonableness standard. Kennedy discusses this issue briefly and ar-
gues that race should not be a permissible factor in determining
whether law enforcement officers had a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot. This conclusion is only strengthened by
the recognition that our society is multiracial. As the number of racial
groups increases, the possibility for error likewise increases, simply be-
cause the diversity of groups and of individuals within each group
makes extrapolations from group characteristics to individual conduct
more tenuous. But even if racial criteria are "rational" in the sense
that the group proxy is a statistically significant predictor of individual
conduct, there is a deeper, normative reason why use of the racial
proxy by law enforcement officials should not be countenanced. Be-
hind the multiracial defense of racial neutrality is the recognition that
governmental use of racial criteria carries with it the secondary costs
of validating and perpetuating racial divisions in our society. Even if
racial suspicions are statistically rational as a descriptive matter, their
use should not be normatively sanctioned through application of the
reasonableness standard.
In particular cases, whether a police officer has impermissibly re-
lied upon race as a basis for his decision raises serious evidentiary is-
sues. In this regard, Kennedy rightly praises United States v. Lay-
mon,71 in which the arresting officer claimed that his physical color-
blindness precluded the possibility that his decision to search the car of
two black youths was racially motivated. 72 The judge carefully con-
sidered the officer's treatment of other minority motorists, concluded
that it was racially motivated, and correctly ruled that the officer had
insufficient justification to conduct the search. 73
But there is another aspect to Laymon that, curiously, Kennedy
does not mention. The officer also claimed that the defendants con-
sented to the search.7 4 The judge rejected this claim:
I further find as a fact that, under the circumstances existing at the time
of his stop, any reasonable traveller, and especially two out-of-state young
71 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Co. I990).
72 See id. at 335.
73 See id. at 339.
74 See id. at 334.
1998] 1303
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Black men in the company of two uniformed and armed white law officers
on a roadside in rural Colorado, would not have felt that he could do any-
thing other than sign the consent to search. 75
This same sentiment was echoed in In re J.M.76 by a dissenting judge
who recounted the history of racism in law enforcement and observed
that "race is a factor that has for many years engendered distrust be-
tween black males and law enforcement personnel.""7 Therefore, he
concluded, "no reasonable innocent black male (with any knowledge of
American history) would feel free to ignore or walk away from a drug
interdicting team."78
What are we to make of these references to racial identity? First,
with respect to consent, the individual defendants must have subjec-
tively felt, based on history or surrounding circumstances or whatever,
intimidated in this racial confrontation. Second, assuming such sub-
jective beliefs existed, there remained a further determination whether,
as a descriptive matter, the defendants' responses were typical for
members of their race over a range of similar circumstances. Finally,
assuming the above, we face the question whether the law should
countenance such racial responses as reasonable from a normative per-
spective. Just as the police should not be able to use race as a sword
for selective enforcement, defendants should not be permitted to use
race as a shield against responsibility. I do not deny the history or
relevance of race in these situations - indeed, I assume it. But to
sanction normatively the use of race in such situations is a different
matter, and inserting race into the question of what is reasonable,
proper conduct, apart from other jurisprudential difficulties, inevitably
leads to chicken-or-egg questions about what causes and perpetuates
the uneasy relationship between law enforcement and racial minorities.
If we are serious about breaking the cycle of racial distrust, neutrality
must work both ways.
In the end, my call to expand the debate by accounting for a multi-
racial reality is a commentary much less on Kennedy's book than on
the general conversation about race. Race, Crime, and the Law does
not intend to speak to broader questions of multiracialism in our soci-
ety. But even in his circumscribed discussion of black-white issues,
Kennedy at times recognizes our multicultural reality and addresses
the implications of that recognition. Indeed, Kennedy has elsewhere
called for a broader conversation about the future of multiracial rela-
tions:
75 Id. at 342.
76 619 A.2d 497 (D.C. 1992).
77 Id. at 512 (Mack, J., dissenting, but concurring in the order to remand).
78 Id. at 513.
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We need to hear about and from those who view Asians as the model
minority. Are they implicitly labeling blacks as the non-model minority?
We need to hear about and from Latinos, Asian Americans and blacks,
who view one another with racial resentment and distrust. What is the
basis of their discord? What would satisfy the antagonists?7 9
When Angela Oh, a member of the Presidential Commission on
Race, suggested that the Commission's discussion should move beyond
the black-white paradigm, the suggestion "brought a ton of bricks
down on Oh as presumably suggesting that other minorities - though
later arriving and often more readily accepted even so - should cut
line on African-Americans.""" The response to Oh's comments shed
much light on the state of the current conversation about race. First,
the response illustrates the continuing dominance of the bichromatic
vision, even in the face of an increasingly obvious multiracial reality
Second, it highlights the importance of history in the debate, even at
the expense of recognizing present conditions and future needs. Fi-
nally, and most significantly, the response presumes a racially contin-
gent entitlement, not simply to a share of any eventual concrete solu-
tions, but also to the terms of the conversation itself. Given this
insistence on race, tension is to be expected among groups seeking to
participate in the conversation. It is ironic that attempts to talk about
race are hindered by an insistence on racial identities. But the irony is
readily understandable given the history of cases like Hall and Gong
Lum, in which different races were trying to distinguish themselves
from others in order to gain advantage under the law. To recall these
episodes is not to deny the primacy of the history of black-white con-
flict, but only to suggest that we should seek guidance from all the les-
sons of history and from present societal conditions in our attempt to
discover a solution for the future.
79 Randall Kennedy, Clinton Must Take Risks on Race Issue, NEWsnAv, June 19, 1997, at
A5.
80 Tom Teepen, Primary Colors in Talk on Race Still Black, White, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug.
17, 1997, at C2.
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THE POLITICS OF COMMON GROUND
Kim Taylor-Thompson*
In an era in which scholars and popular writers all too often use
celebrated cases to exemplify and explain the perils and problems of
the criminal justice system, Professor Randall Kennedy offers a wel-
come antidote. Race, Crime, and the Law demonstrates that we can
best understand the uneasy intersection of race, crime, and the law
against the political and historical backdrop of race in this country.
The book provides a necessary and important reminder: the racial dy-
namics currently at play in the criminal justice system have deep roots
in the past.
Race, Crime, and the Law contributes to the nation's conversation
about race by offering a comprehensive overview of the influence of
race on the criminal justice system. The historical cases that Professor
Kennedy selects tell vividly of disparate treatment based on race.
Case after case impresses the reader with the weight and depth of this
problem. Against this stark background, Kennedy observes that many
of these instances of racially motivated mistreatment of blacks have
provided the impetus for the basic protections that all Americans now
take for granted: the right to be free of torture and the right to a law-
yer in a serious case, to name just two. When Kennedy scrolls forward
to today's criminal justice system, he skillfully attacks the status quo.
He argues that courts remain inattentive to covert discrimination and
inconsistently remedy those violations that they do recognize. Ac-
knowledging that race routinely serves as a proxy for suspicion, he
demands that law enforcement officials refrain from considering race
as evidence of an increased likelihood of criminality. He then exposes
the reader to a large body of social science research that reveals the
continuing impact of race on decisionmakers. By consolidating this
information in an accessible format, Kennedy creates a significant
compendium about race, crime, and law that stands apart from other
books in the field.
Nonetheless, Race, Crime, and the Law proves surprisingly disap-
pointing in the end. In an effort to advocate a moderate course of
analysis and action, Kennedy ultimately ducks the hard question of
how to correct the problem that he has identified. He rarely offers
more than the tacit assumptions about race that we typically find in
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. A.B., Brown
University; J.D., Yale Law School. I appreciate the insightful comments I received from Angela
Jordan Davis, Randy Hertz, Jerry L6pez, Nancy Morawetz, Charles Ogletree, and Anthony
Thompson. I am also grateful to Robin Walker for her research assistance.
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centrist political speech. For the general public, he repackages the
conventional division between victims and offenders by adding black
victims to the equation. For readers who have had experience with
the criminal justice system, he provides less. Although he has recently
focused part of his scholarly agenda on the criminal justice system,
Professor Kennedy's insights here seem removed from the system's
complex workings. When he proposes recommendations, they appear
rudimentary to those who experience daily the pervasive problems that
plague the system. For all its potential, Professor Kennedy's book de-
livers little more than a familiar take on a complicated issue: race
should play no role in the criminal justice system. This point has ob-
vious merit and bears reiterating. Regrettably, though, this is where
the book both begins and ends.
Perhaps what proves most troubling about the book is that Profes-
sor Kennedy's personal views about race infuse, and ultimately skew,
his analysis. Of course, divorcing an examination of the impact of race
from personal experience or perspective is difficult at best. I do not
suggest that such a separation is desirable. My own experiences as an
African American woman who grew up in Harlem and, before enter-
ing academia, practiced for ten years as a public defender in Washing-
ton, D.C., have informed my perception of this age-old question. But
what both surprises and disappoints the reader is that Kennedy barely
acknowledges the centrality of his own views as he discusses racial
questions throughout the book. His politics do not simply serve as
personal ideology. Instead, they frame his articulation and analysis of
the problem of race in the criminal justice system.
From the outset, Kennedy advocates changing the nature of the
politics involved in the country's conflict over race. He acknowledges
that racial justice requires more than merely ending discrimination,
but in the next breath questions the wisdom of race-conscious solu-
tions. We learn that he personally embraces a "politics of respectabil-
ity" that, at its core, seeks to neutralize differences between African
American and white communities in order to encourage white citizens
to respect and support more deeply the cause of racial justice (p. 2 i).
When Kennedy turns his attention to proposals for race-based reforms,
he worries aloud that they will "accentuate the significance of race in
the minds of all," such that the cure will be worse than the disease (p.
245). However, a closer examination reveals that his rejection of race-
conscious mechanisms flows directly, yet without acknowledgment,
from his personal vision of racial politics. In the end, Kennedy
chooses to discount the significance of racial and cultural differences,
perhaps because it seems easier to imagine a world in which race does
not matter than to grapple with the thorny problem at hand.
Obviously, it is impossible to probe Professor Kennedy's views
thoroughly in a short book review. Still, it seems useful to examine
more closely the degree to which his politics divorce him from the in-
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tricate realities of discrimination and ultimately drive him to conclude
that the path to social justice requires minimizing racial differences.
Part I of this Review discusses Kennedy's embrace of a politics of re-
spectability and explores its influence on the assumptions that he
makes about the ways in which communities of color should behave.
Part II adopts a narrower focus, examining the manner in which the
prism of his politics distorts his observations and conclusions about the
implications of race in the context of jury composition and decision-
making.
I. TRAPPED IN HIS OWN UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTIONS
Kennedy begins by alerting the reader that he intends to create a
space between competing ideologies (p. 3). Taking aim at groups all
along the political spectrum, he reproaches both those who pretend
that race does not much matter and those who accord it undue signifi-
cance (pp. 3-7). He complains that many white Americans have been
less than frank about their reactions to race. Although they tend to
decry the use of race in the context of affirmative action, they often
tolerate its role in decisions to arrest and detain (pp. 6-7). Kennedy
admonishes white Americans to be more honest in their claims and
more rigorous in their commitment to antidiscrimination goals (p. 7).
At the same time, he castigates those individuals of color who claim
that every issue involves race and who "all too often make formulaic
allegations of racial misconduct without even bothering to grapple
with evidence and arguments that challenge their conclusions" (p. 7).
Instead of looking for neutral ground, insists Kennedy, these groups
hyperbolize difference by fomenting racial paranoia and feelings of ag-
grievement (p. 8).
So, into the middle steps Professor Kennedy. He promises practical
guidance for moving beyond dogmatic exaggerations toward a more
conciliatory common ground (pp. ix-x). Attributing the lack of sympa-
thy among whites for racial justice to the negative reactions that they
have to distinctive behavioral choices made by African Americans, he
recommends that African American communities change white atti-
tudes by amending their own behavior and outlook. Borrowing from
Professor Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Kennedy urges African
Americans to adopt a "politics of respectability" (p. i7). This concept
establishes white middle-class normative behavior as the fulcrum
around which African Americans should define their conduct. To the
extent that "blacks are capable of meeting the established moral stan-
dards of white middle-class Americans" (p. I7), he argues, black com-
munities can elicit respect from white Americans and can begin to re-
duce whites' indifference to the cause of racial justice (p. 2 i).
Kennedy concedes that the politics of respectability can lead to un-
attractive and unacceptable excesses (p. 18). He criticizes, for example,
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those black individuals who opposed the civil rights movement in the
195OS and 196os out of an undue fear of antagonizing whites (p. 18).
He also condemns others who, wrongly perceiving the need to divorce
themselves from anything associated with "bad Negroes," express un-
disguised contempt for individuals with dark complexions or for rap
music or jazz (p. 18). Still, he champions the core intuitions of the
politics of respectability, finding two aspects of this political theory
particularly pertinent. The first intuition suggests that underenforce-
ment of criminal laws injures African Americans more than overen-
forcement does (p. I9). The second suggests that the social advance-
ment of a stigmatized racial group depends in part on a keen
awareness of the perceptions of those outside the group (p. 20).
Armed with these assumptions, Kennedy directs his attention to
African American communities. He declares that underenforcement of
the criminal law in African American communities poses greater
problems than the "episodic" miscarriage of justice suffered by
wrongly accused African Americans (p. 29). "In terms of misery in-
flicted by direct criminal violence, blacks (and other people of color)
suffer more from the criminal acts of their racial 'brothers' and 'sis-
ters' than they do from the racist misconduct of white police officers,"
he argues (p. 20). Yet Kennedy's evaluation of the relative harms ap-
pears to depend significantly on his politics. In particular, he criticizes
African American communities for "canoniz[ing]" criminals who hap-
pen to be African American (p. 21) and for ignoring important distinc-
tions between law-abiding people of color and lawbreakers (pp. 25-26).
Careful examination of Kennedy's argument reveals a pervasive
underlying assumption that a dichotomy exists between those who
promote the rights of accused persons of color and those who seek to
protect the interests of victims of color.' His observation that people
of color tend to be the victims of crimes committed by other members
of their communities contains obvious truth (p. I9). Indeed, many Af-
rican Americans have mounted anti-crime crusades in response to the
devastating impact of unchecked violence. 2 But this recognition leads
to more complicated attitudes than Kennedy seems willing to accept.
Certainly, some members of communities of color attempt to distin-
guish and distance themselves from lawbreakers. 3 Yet individuals re-
I This assumption echoes a prevailing theme in most popular discussions of crime today. See,
e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
1-7 (1995) (expressing the concern that the criminal justice system inappropriately protects crimi-
nals and ignores victims).
2 See, e.g., Yawu Miller, Muslims Play Key Role in Hub's Fight Against Drugs, Crime, BAY
ST. BANNER, Feb. 27, 1997, at i (noting the anti-crime efforts of Muslims and grass roots groups
in Boston).
3 See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identifica-
tion, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1772 (1992) ("At times, 'the black community' or an element thereof
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acting to high victimization rates often simultaneously identify with
lawbreakers, viewing them as members of their own community and
extensions of their own families. Rather than drawing lines that cast
out offenders, communities of color often conceive of their collective
future as one that is linked to the fates of their individual members,
including lawbreakers.4
Kennedy initially observes that we should not overlook these "webs
of commonality" that connect lawbreakers to law-abiding members of
the community (p. 19). But when he analyzes behavior within com-
munities of color, he falls prey to the same oversight. He fails to ap-
preciate that what he reflexively considers an impenetrable boundary
between victim and accused often becomes blurred within subordi-
nated communities. Individuals of color may be more likely than
white Americans to be victims, but they are also more likely stopped,
questioned, and accused, in part because of race and in part because of
the increased presence of law enforcement in communities of color.
Without ever denying the truth of this counterstory, Kennedy simply
expects communities of color to ignore the fluidity of these roles and to
suppress the tendency to embrace the lawbreakers among them. More
importantly, his politics seem to prevent him from acknowledging that
having seemingly contradictory reactions to crime in one's neighbor-
hood may be a sensible and morally acceptable response. s
In the end, what drives Kennedy's conclusions is the second core
intuition of the politics of respectability: that African Americans
should avoid engaging in conduct that might offend white Americans.
He recommends that African Americans become better attuned to the
impact of such conduct on white citizens' attitudes and willingness to
be generous toward the causes and interests of the black community
(p. 21). Instrumentally, many would defend this position. The history
of African American struggle demonstrates that both members and
leaders of communities of color have repeatedly confronted this di-
lemma. Some have surreptitiously placated whites to avoid the reper-
repudiates those who break the laws and proclaims the distinctiveness and worthiness of those
who do not.").
4 See id.; see also MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN
AMERICAN POLITICS io, x61 (1994) (noting that African Americans have tended to make policy
choices according to a "black utility heuristic," choosing those positions that they consider good
for African Americans as a group); Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in At-
titudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, I
BUFF. Cims. L. REv. 137, 143 (1997) (discussing empirical findings that, compared to whites, Af-
rican Americans tend more uniformly to support a criminal response to drug usage while simulta-
neously rejecting harsher sentences for drug offenders).
5 Kennedy's position here fits squarely with more complete discussions of his political views
on race. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, My Race Problem - and Ours, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
r, 1997, at 55, 55 (shunning notions of racial pride and racial kinship).
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cussions of revealing their true feelings. 6 Still others have recognized
that, given the racial dynamics and disproportionate power relations in
this country, keeping an eye on the reactions of those outside the com-
munity makes good political sense.' Just how mindful people of color
should be of negative reactions to their behavior or political choices
has at times been a matter of historic debate."
But Kennedy does not consider the question open to dispute. He
instead recommends a special courteous attention - perhaps even def-
erence - to the sensitivities of others, particularly white middle-class
Americans. He offers a provocative example to emphasize his point:
the celebration by some African Americans of the acquittal of O.J.
Simpson. Of course, one might question this celebration for a variety
of reasons. Should African Americans have embraced this acquittal as
a "community" victory even though many African Americans consid-
ered the verdict horribly wrong? Should the celebration of an African
American man's vindication in the criminal justice system have oc-
curred when Mr. Simpson had access to resources that other defen-
dants of color rarely have? Kennedy does not much consider these
competing questions reasons to reexamine the celebration. 9 Instead,
the reason that Kennedy advances for refraining from such jubilant
expressions is that "such displays would singe the sensibilities of many,
particularly whites, who perceived the facts of the trial differently" (p.
21).
So when Kennedy turns his attention to the embrace of lawbreak-
ers in communities of color, the second intuition leads him to caution
that such entanglements feed visions that many whites find distasteful.
Unless African Americans transcend this behavior, he warns, they may
harm the cause of those in the community who remain law-abiding
and respectable (p. 17). Although many who live within communities
6 Experiences in the South before the civil rights era suggested that dire consequences often
awaited African Americans who openly expressed their opinions to whites. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du
Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK x66 (Penguin Books 1996) (19o3) (noting that the young Afri-
can American in the South could not be frank and outspoken, but instead often chose to flatter
and "endure petty insults with a smile" to survive).
7 See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 19go DuKE LJ. 758, 8x5-16 (noting how Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.'s strategy of nonviolent protest helped force social change upon white America,
while violent insurrection likely would have failed to break down an entrenched racist ideology).
8 One of the many historical examples involves the heated critique by W.E.B. Du Bois of
Booker T. Washington's racial politics. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" encouraged blacks
not to contest the prevailing social structure that assumed separation of the races, but instead to
accept and work within it. Du Bois argued that, by embracing politics that bowed to white social
expectations, Washington was insisting that blacks adopt "the old attitude of adjustment and
submission." Du Bois, supra note 6, at 43. For this and other examples of the historical divide,
see Peller, cited above in note 7.
9 To the extent that Kennedy does offer other explanations for this behavior, he notes that
African Americans who celebrated the acquittal may have acted out of anger toward a system
that they identify with oppression. But again, he criticizes the tendency to "martyrize]" criminals
as an inappropriate "inversion of values" (p. 26).
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of color share Kennedy's belief that lawbreakers endanger the com-
munity and deserve punishment, their reactions to crime demonstrate
that this concern does not lead inexorably to a call for shunning and
permanently ostracizing lawbreakers. 10  More importantly, many
would question Kennedy's almost reflexive choice to look to white
middle-class communities to determine the appropriate African Ameri-
can response.
Kennedy quickly anticipates that some may criticize his politics of
respectability as one that "smells of Uncle Tomism" (p. 21). But by
preemptively defending against the cheap shot, he sidesteps the more
interesting questions that his choice of politics generates. He overlooks
that principled people can disagree about what constitutes "respect-
ability" and acceptable behavior. Kennedy simply assumes without
question or amplification that white middle-class communities set the
standard against which communities of color should measure their be-
havior. He never identifies what the "established" norms are, and he
does not even question whether they actually exist in white middle-
class communities. Finally, he never asks whether "one size fits all"
standards make sense in a country of differently situated communities.
Although the connections between Kennedy's analysis and his poli-
tics do not necessarily throw his conclusions into question, these links
invite a rigorous inspection that Kennedy himself consistently evades.
Part 11 undertakes such an examination with regard to one of the is-
sues Kennedy addresses in the book - the impact of race on jury
composition and decisionmaking.
II. His POLITICS AS APPLIED
Professor Kennedy begins his examination of race's influence on
the composition of modern juries by affirming his commitment to the
view that "race can play no proper role" in drawing distinctions be-
tween individuals (p. 169). Considering the statistical evidence, Ken-
nedy admits that people of color continue to represent a disproportion-
ately low percentage of jurors (p. 232), even though they remain
heavily represented as defendants (pp. 22-23). Although he attributes
the racial disparities on juries to multiple factors (pp. 232-33), he ac-
knowledges that one cause may be the vestiges of past racial discrimi-
nation (p. 236). Still, he rejects as a remedy those proposals requiring
racially mixed juries (pp. 169, 231). Kennedy criticizes those who want
to make juries "look like America," and calls instead for the creation of
a system that "looks beyond looks" (p. xi). Though this lovely turn of
10 See Meares, supra note 4, at i6o-6i ("African American women in poor neighborhoods are
torn.... [They] want better crime control and law enforcement. [But] they [also] understand
that increased levels of law enforcement potentially saddle their children with a felony conviction
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phrase seems appealing at first blush, it ultimately reveals a failure to
appreciate fully the centrality of race in this country. As much as we
might hope otherwise, "looks" still have meaning in our society.
Perhaps more than any other characteristic, a person's race carries
with it a "socializing history."'" Race defines and delineates experi-
ences and perceptions in this country with resulting differences in op-
portunities 12 and world views. I3  Indeed, mock jury studies suggest
that jurors of color may bring distinctive experiences into deliberations
and may actually prod an otherwise all-white jury into confronting
commonly held assumptions and approaching evidence from a differ-
ent analytical position. For example, studies and polls reveal that atti-
tudes about police officers often diverge along racial lines. Despite
jury instructions that admonish jurors to treat police officers like any
other witnesses, white jurors generally tend to credit police officers'
testimony,14 while jurors of color are more likely to approach their tes-
timony with skepticism or even mistrust.' Without this latter per-
spective on a jury, an officer's testimony might escape the depth of
analysis that juries generally apply to the testimony of other witnesses.
Interestingly, Professor Kennedy does not seem overly concerned
with the exclusion of these distinct perspectives. In his discussion -
and condemnation - of jury nullification, he recognizes that African
American jurors may assess evidence and resolve credibility questions
differently from white jurors (p. 4 n.6). But Kennedy seems unwilling
to abide the difference that African American jurors might bring to
jury deliberations. For example, he worries that jurors of color may be
"unreasonably skeptical" of police testimony (p. 4). At the same time,
he seems quite comfortable tolerating the asymmetry inherent in per-
mitting white jurors to bring unchecked biases into the deliberative
process.
Significantly, neutralizing the behavior of African American jurors
fits squarely within Kennedy's political vision. He imagines that, if
stigmatized groups would simply adopt established norms of behavior,
they could eliminate potentially alienating distinctions. Once this oc-
curred, an all-white jury might be fully capable of sharing the perspec-
11 MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 49 (1978).
12 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 2 (1993) (describing patterns of racial
segregation as the principal organizing feature of American society).
13 See generally ANDREV HACKER, TwO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (tracing the implications of race in America).
14 See Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of
Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 5 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 525 n.68 (1994).
15 These results are perhaps due to the less than favorable experiences that black jurors have
had with law enforcement. See GALLUP ORG., BLACKJWHITE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, EXECUTIVE SuMMARY, June ro, 1997 (finding that 6o% of African Americans surveyed
believe that police treat them less fairly than they treat whites).
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tive of people of color.16 Although this position has some merit, expe-
rience suggests that the historic and contemporary divide between
races in this country makes the attainment of this ideal uncertain at
best.17 Given the patterns of residential segregation that occur with
increasing frequency in America,' 8 white citizens and citizens of color
tend not to share experiences with each other beyond limited contacts
in school and in the workplace.' 9 This lack of meaningful interaction
and shared concrete experiences - social, casual, and job-related -
only reinforces the view that one group cannot simply generalize from
its experience to account for absent or excluded perspectives.
The geographic and social isolation of racial groups carries an addi-
tional consequence: it leads groups to resort to categorization in at-
tempting to understand the behavior of other groups. Social cognition
theory posits that human beings design strategies to simplify the com-
plex world that we encounter. We all tend to divide the world into
categories that help us "identify stimuli quickly, ... fill in information
... , and select a strategy for obtaining further information, solving a
problem, or reaching a goal."'20 Social science research has confirmed
that we similarly resort to categories or stereotypes in attempting to
understand and predict the behavior of others.2 1 Studies of this phe-
nomenon have found that stereotypes are so ingrained that an individ-
ual's memory of events tends to organize around them.22
In the context of the jury system, this phenomenon raises great
concern. Once a stereotype activates, individuals process events selec-
tively, such that material corroborating the stereotype receives greater
16 Professor Kennedy suggests that, as long as the process of jury selection has been "kept free
of racial selectivity..., there is nothing inherently wrong with an all-white jury deciding the fate
of a black defendant or an all-black jury deciding the fate of a white defendant" (p. xi).
17 One obvious example of this divide involves the state and federal trials of the officers who
beat an African American motorist, Rodney King. The state jury, which lacked the perspective of
a single African American juror, acquitted the officers of all charges. See Laurie L. Levinson, The
Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King 7Wal, 41
UCLA L. REV. 509, 525-27 (1994). In contrast, the federal trial jury, which was composed of nine
whites, two African Americans, and one Latino, convicted the officers of civil rights violations
arising out of the same incident. See id. at 530 n.16, 532.
18 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 12, at 165-31.
19 See HACKER, supra note 13, at 3-17.
20 Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in
i SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 89, 93-94; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. i61, 1I88-0 (995) (discussing stereotypes as categorical
structures).
21 See, e.g., Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in i STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1-49 (Neil Warren ed., 1977).
22 See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Mem-




attention.23 Information that seems to contradict stereotypical expec-
tations often will be overlooked.24 These stereotypic biases may occur
without conscious thought even in individuals who would not endorse
racist beliefs. 25  To the extent that jurors belonging to the stereotyped
group participate during deliberations, they can be expected to have
processed information differently during the trial and to present the
other members of the jury with competing stereotypes against which to
make judgments. Indeed, the best foil to generalized views about out-
groups may be the inclusion of a member of that group who can offer
particularized experiences that call the stereotype into question. 26
Of course, adding people of color to a jury will not necessarily re-
duce reliance on stereotypes. For instance, black jurors themselves not
only resort to stereotypes, but may even hold negative views about
members of their own race.27 Still, including African American jurors
might expand the range of stereotypes in play and, in this way and
others, enrich the conversation. Although we might be tempted to
imagine that the addition of jurors of color would necessarily advan-
tage an accused person of color, such inclusion might prove otherwise.
At least one study has demonstrated that jurors of color often judge
defendants of color more harshly than other jurors do.28 Thus, even
though race may not be predictive of outcome, it remains a rough, yet
sufficiently reliable proxy for a difference in perspective.
Still, Kennedy seems unwilling to accept that race centrally affects
perception. He compounds this error by framing his discussion of
race-conscious remedies in loaded terms: he questions whether juris-
dictions should be permitted to discriminate racially to promote or en-
sure the presence of people of color on juries (p. 232). By labeling as
"discrimination" any affirmative use or consideration of race, Kennedy
creates a paper tiger that he can then easily defeat. Kennedy acknowl-
23 See Dale T. Miller & William 'Irnbull, Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes, 37 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 233, 247 (1986) (finding that the activation of stereotypic concepts leads to an en-
coding bias that involves selective attention toward stereotypic-consistent information and an at-
tributional bias that causes individuals to discount or reinterpret stereotypic-inconsistent informa-
tion).
24 See id.
2S See Bodenhausen, supra note 22, at 735.
26 Cf. Dolores A. Perez, Harmon M. Hosch, Bruce Ponder & Gloria Chanez Trejo, Ethnicity of
Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1249, 1260
(1993) (concluding based on empirical research that "the majority presence of a cognizable group
on a jury can serve to counterbalance disparate treatment of a defendant who is a member of that
same group").
27 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (I977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting
that "members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by at-
tempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the majority's
negative attitudes towards the minority").
28 Cf. Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They
Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 22, 27 (i98o) (finding that black women are more in-
clined to convict defendants of color before deliberation than are whites).
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edges that strategic use of peremptory challenges may effectively re-
move extremes of predilection from the jury panel, but he asserts that
the benefits of "strategic racial discrimination" do not outweigh the
costs (pp. 227-28). He cautions that the public will view any adoption
of race-based decisionmaking as evidence of the justice system's un-
willingness to disentangle itself from race (p. 228). More significantly,
he worries that adoption of race-conscious proposals would be read as
an endorsement not only of the view that race does matter, but also
that it should matter in the adjudication of guilt or innocence (p. 228).
What Kennedy overlooks in his cost-benefit analysis is the conse-
quence of the public's perception that the criminal justice system prin-
cipally involves white decisionmakers determining the fate of people of
color. Even if he doubts that people of color bring sufficiently differ-
ent views to an individual jury, he fails to appreciate the attendant
cost of the loss of legitimacy suffered by a system that at best limits -
and at worst excludes - their perspectives.
To ensure that a person of color has the opportunity to face a jury
containing some members of her racial group, a number of scholars
have proposed mechanisms to increase racial diversity on the jury
panel. Propelled by the belief that underrepresentation is a social evil
in that it increases the likelihood of all-white juries, one scholar has
endorsed a proposal that accused persons of color be entitled to a
given number of "self-identifying" people of color on their juries.29
Arguing that racial diversity broadens the base of knowledge upon
which the jury can base its determinations and ultimately dispense jus-
tice, others have suggested that accused persons of color are entitled to
at least three "racially similar" individuals on the jury.3 0 Although
these suggestions may raise questions of their own, each offers a con-
crete mechanism for confronting the problem of race head on and, un-
like Kennedy's suggestions, each provokes considerable thought about
the question of race at the trial level.
Kennedy concedes that proponents of these proposals offer strong
arguments in support of their respective positions (p. 245). Nonethe-
less, he concludes that such measures are undesirable, challenging
them, in part, by questioning their administrative feasibility.31 He also
29 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DuKE L.J 704, 710-I (1995).
30 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. x6x1, 16gs-
1700 (1985). See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say Nol: A Proposal To Eliminate Racially
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRMI. L. REV. 1099, 1113-16 ('994)
(surveying race-conscious proposals for jury selection).
31 Kennedy questions the ability of a court to identify jurors who are "racially similar" to the
accused; he asks, for example, whether "a Latino who traces his heritage back to Mexico [is] 'ra-
cially similar'" to those of Puerto Rican descent (p. 244). Obviously, in a multicultural society, this
question cannot be answered easily. Differences exist among and within races. However, simi-
larities in treatment and experience often emerge in this country that transcend difference and
create bonds that might not otherwise exist. Perhaps one way to address the administrative con-
cern would be to attempt to include people of the same racial background. If that failed, the
W36 [Vol. II:33o6
BOOK REVIEW
expresses concern that such measures will encourage partisanship
among jurors.3 2 But in the end, Kennedy's principal objection to these
proposals stems from his adamant resistance to the concept that race
poses a substantial obstacle for the accused person of color facing an
all-white jury (pp. 242-43). True to the politics of respectability, which
hopes to neutralize racial differences, he cannot afford to find that race
matters much in jury decisionmaking.
When Kennedy informs us that racial distinctions that occur in the
criminal justice system can be overcome (p. 252), he does so with a cer-
tainty that invites inquiry into the basis for his confidence. Obviously,
the historical evidence of racism and the empirical studies of current
manifestations of the problem of race that Kennedy has amassed pro-
vide him with useful data from which to make observations. How-
ever, such material permits us to know and understand the criminal
justice system only to a limited degree. Kennedy does not indicate
whether he has ever had direct contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem or whether he has spoken extensively with people who have. The
experience one gains as a prosecutor, judge, or defense lawyer - or,
for that matter, as a juror, defendant, or complaining witness - could
have offered an important source of analogy or counterpoint for his
conclusions. Additionally, Kennedy does not base his beliefs on field
observations, as an anthropologist or daily court observer would. On
any given day, we find citizens watching trials. Although some may
have nothing meaningful to say about their observations, it has been
my experience, as a trial lawyer, that their daily attendance enables
these untrained observers to notice trends and form insights that often
escape seasoned lawyers. Remarkably, Kennedy does not acknowledge
in the book the limits of his own experience.
Perhaps because he has never been in the position of a litigant who
faces a jury that holds either his or his lawyer's race 33 against him,
Kennedy can cling to the belief that race-conscious mechanisms are ul-
timately unnecessary. In a groundbreaking work published in 1985,
Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson used statistical analyses of conviction
and sentencing rates, mock jury studies, and social science research to
show that race affects decisions to convict and choices of sentence.3 4
court could give the accused person of color the choice between including a given number of ju-
rors of color who did not share his racial heritage or proceeding with an all-white jury.
32 Professor Kennedy cautions that, if the court adopts race-conscious measures, jurors will
vote as representatives of their respective groups (p. 243). Kennedy's concerns about racial parti-
sanship ignore the extent to which race already informs jurors' judgments. If jurors already bring
predispositions along racial lines to the deliberation room, then Kennedy's acceptance of the
status quo would allow partisanship to continue.
33 See Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 63, 88-90 (1993) (discussing studies examining
the impact of a lawyer's race on jury decisions).
34 See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1616-51.
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Although her work is one of the most frequently cited studies on the
question of the effect of race on jury decisions, Kennedy remains un-
convinced. Instead, he downplays the fear that race matters in jury
decisionmaking. Although he agrees that the racial composition of ju-
ries may affect the outcome in certain trials, he contends that Professor
Johnson overstates her point (p. 242) and fails to make a case for her
position that race adversely affects accused persons of color (pp. 242-
43).
Kennedy argues that the archival evidence and mock jury studies
that Professor Johnson cited in 1985 inadequately support her ultimate
conclusions. He notes that Professor Johnson herself posits that, when
the evidence in a given case is strong one way or the other, racial
makeup may not matter (p. 242). The studies that Professor Johnson
cites indicate that race has the most significant impact in cases in
which the evidence is "marginal" (p. 242). Thus, Kennedy argues that
whether we consider the problem posed by an all-white jury as a sub-
stantial or a minor one will depend in part on the number of marginal
evidence cases that are brought - "a figure no one really knows". (pp.
242-43).
Professor Johnson does note that, in the context of mock jury stud-
ies, researchers found race to be more influential when the fact pat-
terns had been manipulated to be more ambiguous. 35 Obviously, in a
laboratory experiment, researchers can develop fact patterns that will
appear strong or weak, because researchers determine what evidence
the jurors will hear. But how frequently can the evidence in an actual
trial be considered so strong as to make the case open-and-shut? Some
might argue that the evidence against O.J. Simpson presented such a
case. Yet as those of us who have practiced know from experience -
and as the rest of us know from hindsight - individual jurors view
evidence differently and evaluate the strength or weakness of evidence
through the lenses of their own perceptions and experiences. In other
words, racial and gender differences may encourage different jurors to
view the same evidence in divergent ways, thereby producing widely
different perceptions of whether a case is strong, weak, or marginal.
Even more importantly, although we might not be able to supply a
numerical answer to Professor Kennedy's question regarding the fre-
quency with which marginal cases proceed to trial, it seems safe to
posit that the cases that do proceed to trial tend not to be the over-
whelmingly strong ones. The cases in which the evidence of guilt is
strongest often result in guilty pleas.36 Thus, race likely would play a
role in a considerable number of cases.
3s See id. at 1627.
36 Approximately 92% of all felony cases in state courts are resolved through guilty pleas. See
PATRICK A. LANGAN & HELEN A. GRAZIADE1, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 1992, at o (995). In misdemeanor cases, the percentage of guilty pleas may be
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If race does influence some cases, then it would seem imperative
that - at least in those cases - people of color be included on the
jury to counteract the biases of other players in the criminal justice
system. Although Professor Kennedy expresses concern about the ten-
dency of lawyers to make racial appeals to juries (pp. 256-57), he fails
to see diversity on the jury as one possible response. The inclusion of
people of color on the jury could have an impact on the types of argu-
ments lawyers advance. To the extent that a jury is racially mixed, it
seems less likely that either the prosecution or the defense will make
direct racial appeals. Attempts to objectify the accused through the
use of animal imagery, 7 for example, or through appeals to general-
ized racial fears,38 might not be as persuasive to jurors who share the
same racial heritage as the accused. It is less likely that members of a
diverse jury will rely on such arguments to reach consensus during de-
liberations.
Given Professor Kennedy's concern for victims of color, we might
expect him to embrace the affirmative selection of jurors of color as an
opportunity to give voice to the victim's perspective in the deliberation
room. But he does not. Mock jury studies and statistical analyses
have examined whether the race of the victim impacts the determina-
tion of guilt and the assignment of punishment. The results indicate
that a victim of color can often expect varying treatment depending on
the racial makeup of the jury. For example, Gary D. LaFree con-
ducted posttrial interviews of 36o actual jurors in rape trials in Indi-
anapolis.3 9 The jurors, who tended to be white,40 made comments re-
even higher. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Sys-
temic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 74 n.6 (1995).
With the advent of mandatory minimum sentencing schemes, a defendant faced with a strong
case may still opt for trial, because she perceives little benefit to pleading guilty. See, e.g., A Re-
turn of Judgment to the Judging Process: "3 Strikes" Ruling Restores Courts' Rightful Authority,
L.A. TIMES, June 2 1, 1996, at B8 (discussing the fiscal problems that the "three strikes and you're
out" law causes because "fewer defendants are pleading guilty"). Even factoring in those in-
stances, however, cases that go to trial typically are not open-and-shut.
37 For example, in the trial of Bernhard Goetz, defense lawyers referred to the four African
American victims in the trial as "vultures," "predators," and "savages." See GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 206
(1988).
38 See, e.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 534, 540-43 (D.N.J. 1985) (overturning a mur-
der conviction in part because the prosecution made an unsubstantiated argument to the jury that
Mr. Carter, who is African American, murdered total strangers because they were white), qffd,
826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987); Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Ap-
proach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1212 (1992) (re-
counting an argument in a death penalty case in which the prosecutors asked an all-white jury
whether it could "imagine the fear that [the victim] went through ... out with three blacks").
39 See GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SExUAL ASSAULT 154-55, 208-28 (2989). Professor Kennedy acknowledges the importance of this
study; however, he only uses its findings to support his view that the criminal justice system "un-
der-protects" victims of color (pp. 73-74). He does not then take the next step to suggest that a
diversity of perspectives on the jury might give voice to the victim's views during deliberations.
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vealing the influence of stereotypes about black women on their deci-
sionmaking. One juror voted to acquit in a prosecution for the rape of
a young African American because a girl "from 'that kind of neigh-
borhood' probably wasn't a virgin anyway."41 The jurors viewed Af-
rican American rape complainants as more likely to have consented to
sex or as more sexually experienced and therefore less harmed by the
assaults.42 Similarly, the comprehensive statistical analysis by David
C. Baldus, which served as the basis for the defense's attack on the
racist application of the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp,43 reveals
that, in the context of capital cases, jurors - as well as prosecutors -
tend to devalue the harm inflicted on a victim of color.44 Although
Kennedy seems troubled by the statistics regarding the impact of race
in the death penalty context (p. 336), he declines to transfer that con-
cern to the impact of white jurors evaluating questions of credibility
and harm in noncapital criminal cases.
Having rejected race-conscious proposals at the trial level, Profes-
sor Kennedy instead endorses largely ineffective race-neutral proposals
at the administrative level. For example, he recommends that locali-
ties end their reliance on voter registration lists as a source of potential
venire members, because this mechanism has been found to limit the
number of eligible jurors of color. He also suggests that court officials
supplement the list of registered voters with lists of citizens who have
received drivers' licenses or paid local taxes (p. 241). Although these
recommendations are useful steps for increasing the number of people
of color in the jury pool, they are unlikely to effect real change in the
makeup of the petit jury. As Kennedy himself acknowledges, a geo-
graphical region that institutes these reforms but continues to select ju-
rors randomly from a population that is fifteen percent black will have
all-white juries in fourteen percent of its cases (p. 242).4 5 Kennedy's
embrace of these recommendations suggests a naive faith that change
can occur without fundamental reforms in the jury system.
40 See LAFREE, supra note 39, at 210.
41 Id. at 220.
42 See id. at 219-2o. LaFree also noted that "[o]ther jurors were simply less willing to believe
the testimony of black complainants." Id. at 220. One white juror told researchers: "Negroes
have a way of not telling the truth. They've a knack for coloring the story. So you know you
can't believe everything they say." Id.
43 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
44 Baldus examined records involving the disposition of more than 2000 murder cases between
1973 and 1979 in Georgia and discovered that the odds of being condemned to death were 4.3
times greater for defendants who killed white victims than for defendants who killed black vic-
tims. See id. at 286-87; id. at 355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, ioS YALE L.J. 825,
836 (ig5) (book review).
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H. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, one comes away from Professor Kennedy's book feeling
that it represents a lost opportunity. Kennedy's voice is a potentially
important one. But when that voice preaches at the same time that it
purports to analyze, it loses much of its power. And the more that
Kennedy's politics circumscribe his analysis of a given issue, the more
likely it is that the most interesting questions will be ignored or rele-
gated to the margins. Although Kennedy embraces a popular vision of
a race-neutral world, he cannot hope to advance that goal by dis-
counting evidence that race figures prominently in our perceptions and
in our application of justice. He also cannot sidestep real, cultural dif-
ferences borne of experience simply by urging Americans toward neu-
tral ground. Though heated debate often feels tumultuous, in the end
it permits us to face our differences squarely. Perhaps then we may
inch toward change.
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